Malicious Relay Detection and Legitimate Channel Recovery

Malicious Relay Detection and Legitimate Channel Recovery
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恶意中继检测和合法通道恢复

DOI:
10.1145/3558482.3590193
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Srinivasan, Kannan
Srinivasan, Kannan
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Zhao, Xingya;Chen, Wei-Han;Srinivasan, Kannan

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全双工设备可通过信号中继危害无线信道测量的完整性,已提出了几种基于此漏洞的攻击。现有的依赖于先前收集的签名的源认证方法在检测这些攻击方面面临着巨大的挑战,因为中继攻击者可以逐渐注入通道,从而使被操纵的通道落入认证方法的容忍范围内,并且被误认为是新的签名。在本文中,我们提出了RelayShield,一个用于检测恶意中继并从被操纵的通道中恢复合法收发通道的系统。RelayShield只需要在接收器处进行一次通道测量。它分析从输入通道解析的信号路径信息,以检测继电器和恢复通道。RelayShield使用在两个典型室内环境中收集的通道实现了95%以上的检测准确率。恢复的信道可以支持广泛的应用,包括秘密生成协议和侦听系统。
Full-duplex devices can compromise the integrity of wireless channel measurements through signal relaying and several attacks have been proposed based on this vulnerability. Existing source authentication methods relying on previously-collected signatures face significant challenges in detecting these attacks because a relay attacker can gradually inject the channels so that the manipulated channels will fall within the tolerance range of the authentication methods and are mistaken as new signatures. In this paper, we propose RelayShield, a system for detecting malicious relays and recovering the legitimate transmitter-receiver channels from the manipulated channels. RelayShield requires only one channel measurement at the receiver. It analyzes signal path information resolved from input channels to detect relays and recover channels. RelayShield achieves over 95% detection accuracy with channels collected in two typical indoor environments. The recovered channels can support a wide range of applications, including secret generation protocols and sensing systems.
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