GuardION: Practical Mitigation of DMA-Based Rowhammer Attacks on ARM

GuardION: Practical Mitigation of DMA-Based Rowhammer Attacks on ARM
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DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-93411-2_5
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发表时间:
2018-06
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通讯作者:
V. V. D. Veen-V.;Martina Lindorfer;Y. Fratantonio;H. Pillai;Giovanni Vigna;Christopher Krügel;H. Bos;Kaveh Razavi
V. V. D. Veen-V.;Martina Lindorfer;Y. Fratantonio;H. Pillai;Giovanni Vigna;Christopher Krügel;H. Bos;Kaveh Razavi
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其他
文献类型:
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作者:
V. V. D. Veen-V.;Martina Lindorfer;Y. Fratantonio;H. Pillai;Giovanni Vigna;Christopher Krügel;H. Bos;Kaveh Razavi

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在过去的两年里,Rowhammer漏洞从一个难以利用的DRAM干扰错误转变为一个完全武器化的攻击载体。研究人员不仅展示了对台式电脑的攻击,还展示了利用单比特翻转来破坏云和移动设备的攻击,所有这些都不依赖于任何软件漏洞。由于硬件级别的缓解措施无法反向移植,因此迫切需要寻找软件防御措施。然而,学术界和工业界提出的建议要么不切实际,要么不足以阻止所有攻击:我们提出了ampage,一组基于dma的针对最新Android操作系统的Rowhammer攻击,包括(1)根漏洞,(2)一系列绕过所有防御的应用程序到应用程序漏洞场景。为了减轻Rowhammer在ARM上的利用,我们提出了guardion,这是一种轻量级防御,通过隔离DMA缓冲区和保护行来防止基于DMA的攻击(移动设备上的主要攻击向量)。我们在22个基准应用程序上评估了guartionon2,并表明它的内存开销可以忽略不计(平均2.2 MB)。我们进一步表明,在谷歌对以前的攻击作出反应而禁用了高阶分配后,我们可以通过重新启用高阶分配来提高系统性能。
Over the last two years, the Rowhammer bug transformed from a hard-to-exploit DRAM disturbance error into a fully weaponized attack vector. Researchers demonstrated exploits not only against desktop computers, but also used single bit flips to compromise the cloud and mobile devices, all without relying on any software vulnerability.Since hardware-level mitigations cannot be backported, a search for software defenses is pressing. Proposals made by both academia and industry, however, are either impractical to deploy, or insufficient in stopping all attacks: we presentrampage, a set of DMA-based Rowhammer attacks against the latest Android OS, consisting of (1) a root exploit, and (2) a series of app-to-app exploit scenarios that bypass all defenses.To mitigate Rowhammer exploitation on ARM, we proposeguardion, a lightweight defense that prevents DMA-based attacks—the main attack vector on mobile devices—by isolating DMA buffers with guard rows. We evaluateguardionon 22 benchmark apps and show that it has a negligible memory overhead (2.2 MB on average). We further show that we can improve system performance by re-enabling higher order allocations after Google disabled these as a reaction to previous attacks.