GuardION: Practical Mitigation of DMA-Based Rowhammer Attacks on ARM
GuardION: Practical Mitigation of DMA-Based Rowhammer Attacks on ARM
复制标题
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-93411-2_5
复制
发表时间:
2018-06
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
V. V. D. Veen-V.;Martina Lindorfer;Y. Fratantonio;H. Pillai;Giovanni Vigna;Christopher Krügel;H. Bos;Kaveh Razavi
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
V. V. D. Veen-V.;Martina Lindorfer;Y. Fratantonio;H. Pillai;Giovanni Vigna;Christopher Krügel;H. Bos;Kaveh Razavi
Over the last two years, the Rowhammer bug transformed from a hard-to-exploit DRAM disturbance error into a fully weaponized attack vector. Researchers demonstrated exploits not only against desktop computers, but also used single bit flips to compromise the cloud and mobile devices, all without relying on any software vulnerability.Since hardware-level mitigations cannot be backported, a search for software defenses is pressing. Proposals made by both academia and industry, however, are either impractical to deploy, or insufficient in stopping all attacks: we presentrampage, a set of DMA-based Rowhammer attacks against the latest Android OS, consisting of (1) a root exploit, and (2) a series of app-to-app exploit scenarios that bypass all defenses.To mitigate Rowhammer exploitation on ARM, we proposeguardion, a lightweight defense that prevents DMA-based attacks—the main attack vector on mobile devices—by isolating DMA buffers with guard rows. We evaluateguardionon 22 benchmark apps and show that it has a negligible memory overhead (2.2 MB on average). We further show that we can improve system performance by re-enabling higher order allocations after Google disabled these as a reaction to previous attacks.