Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects.
Playing the Fertility Game at Work: An Equilibrium Model of Peer Effects.
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DOI：
10.1111/iere.12177
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发表时间：
2016-08
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Simonsen M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ciliberto F;Miller AR;Nielsen HS;Simonsen M
我们使用一个允许多重均衡的同事间战略互动的博弈论模型来研究生育决策中的职场同伴效应。使用基于登记的数据，在丹麦中型企业工作的育龄妇女，我们发现了负面的平均同伴效应。考虑到工人类型的异质性影响，我们发现，在年龄或教育程度不同的工人类型中，积极影响占主导地位。负面影响在各年龄组和受教育程度低的人群中占主导地位。政策模拟表明，这些估计的影响使妇女工作地点的分布成为预测人口生育率的一个重要考虑因素，而不仅仅是她们是否工作。
We study workplace peer effects in fertility decisions using a game theory model of strategic interactions among coworkers that allows for multiple equilibria. Using register-based data on fertile-aged women working in medium sized establishments in Denmark, we uncover negative average peer effects. Allowing for heterogeneous effects by worker type, we find that positive effects dominate across worker types defined by age or education. Negative effects dominate within age groups and among low-education types. Policy simulations show that these estimated effects make the distribution of where women work an important consideration, beyond simply if they work, in predicting population fertility.