Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
复制标题
在职与分配政治：墨西哥的政府间转移
DOI：
10.1002/soej.12226
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Philip Jones
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Abbott;René Cabral;Philip Jones
在本文中，我们的目标是关注政治家依赖政府间转移支付来实现政治野心的可能性。在什么情况下，现任者更有可能依靠转移来赢得选票，而不是奖励核心支持者？约束（引入约束是为了确保政治家依赖于预先确定的公式，这些公式减少了设计转移支付以赢得连任的激励）可能会如何影响“分配政治”？在这篇文章中的预测进行测试，参考政府间转移到31个墨西哥州之间的2004年和2012年。
In this article, the objective is to focus on the likelihood that politicians will rely on intergovernmental transfers to pursue political ambition. In what circumstances are incumbents more likely to rely on transfers to win votes, than to reward core supporters? How are constraints (introduced to ensure that politicians rely on predetermined formulae which reduce the incentive to design transfers to win re‐election) likely to influence “distributive politics?” Predictions in this article are tested with reference to intergovernmental transfers to 31 Mexican states between 2004 and 2012.