Japanese Corporate Governance and Macroeconomic Problems
Japanese Corporate Governance and Macroeconomic Problems
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日本公司治理与宏观经济问题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.235758
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Morck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Masao Nakamura;R. Morck
日本长期的经济问题不仅仅是由于错误的宏观经济政策。我们不否认宏观经济政策失误的重要性，但认为日本公司治理中更深层次的弊病使该国越来越容易受到这些问题的影响。我们认为，日本的主要银行和金融经连会系统的公司治理主要是在债权人手中，而不是股东。因此，日本的治理实践没有将有效的控制权分配给剩余索取权人。我们认为，这导致了广泛的资本配置不当，使日本陷入产能过剩和流动性问题。
Japan's prolonged economic problems are due to more than faulty macro-economic policies. We do not deny the importance of bungled macro-economic policy, but argue than deeper maladies in Japanese corporate governance made that country increasingly vulnerable to such problems. We argue that Japan's main bank and financial keiretsu systems left corporate governance largely in the hands of creditors rather than shareholders. thus, Japanese governance practices did not assign effective control rights to residual claimants. This, we argue led to a widespread misallocation of capital that mired Japan in excess capacity and liquidity problems.