Sec Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade
Sec Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.541502
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发表时间：
2009-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alan D. Jagolinzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Alan D. Jagolinzer
美国证券交易委员会颁布了规则10 b5 -1，以阻止内部人士利用私人信息进行交易，但也保护内部人士预先计划的、不基于信息的交易免受诉讼。尽管该规则要求内部人士在没有私下知情的情况下计划交易，但该规则似乎允许战略性交易。参与的内部人员的销售系统地遵循积极的和消极的公司业绩之前，产生的异常前瞻性回报大于非参与的同事所赚取的。所观察到的关联似乎不能用市场交易披露反应、积极业绩后的“可预测”回归或一般定期价格下跌来解释。然而，有证据表明，随机抽取的计划启动中有相当大的比例与即将披露的负面新闻有关。还有证据表明，提前终止销售计划与即将到来的积极业绩转变有关，从而降低了内部人士以低价执行销售的可能性。总的来说，这表明，平均而言，在规则范围内交易并不仅仅反映了不知情的多样化。
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission enacted Rule 10b5-1 to deter insiders from trading with private information, yet also protect insiders' preplanned, non-information-based trades from litigation. Despite its requirement that insiders plan trades when not privately informed, the rule appears to enable strategic trade. Participating insiders' sales systematically follow positive and precede negative firm performance, generating abnormal forward-looking returns larger than those earned by nonparticipating colleagues. The observed association does not appear to be explained by market transaction disclosure response, “predictable” reversion following positive performance, or general periodic price declines. There is evidence, however, that a substantive proportion of randomly drawn plan initiations are associated with pending adverse news disclosures. There is also evidence that early sales plan terminations are associated with pending positive performance shifts, reducing the likelihood that insiders' sales execute at low prices. Collectively, this suggests that, on average, trading within the rule does not solely reflect uninformed diversification.