Strategic Transfer Pricing
Strategic Transfer Pricing
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DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.44.4.451
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发表时间：
1998-04
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Michael G. Alles;S. Datar
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael G. Alles;S. Datar
大多数对成本系统的研究都集中在其动机影响上。本文采取了不同的方法，通过开发一个模型，两个寡头垄断企业战略性地选择他们的成本为基础的转移价格。双头垄断模型经常假设企业在价格选择上进行博弈。然而，产品价格最终取决于公司的转移价格，转移价格将制造成本传达给营销部门。正是出于这个原因，转让价格将具有战略意义。我们得出的影响，成本制度的选择和转移定价，包括表明，企业可能会交叉补贴他们的产品的结果与实证证据一致。
Most research into cost systems has focused on their motivational implications. This paper takes a different approach, by developing a model where two oligopolistic firms strategically select their cost-based transfer prices. Duopoly models frequently assume that firms game on their choice of prices. Product prices, however, are ultimately based on the firms' transfer prices that communicate manufacturing costs to marketing departments. It is for this reason that transfer prices will have a strategic component to them. We derive implications for cost system choice and transfer pricing, including showing that firms may cross subsidize their products-a result consistent with the empirical evidence.