Qualifying for a government’s scrappage program to stimulate consumers’ trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer
Qualifying for a government’s scrappage program to stimulate consumers’ trade-in transactions? Analysis of an automobile supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer
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有资格参与政府刺激消费者以旧换新交易的报废计划吗？
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2014.05.012
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发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Luo Chunlin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Huang Jian;Leng Mingming;Liang Liping;Luo Chunlin
我们研究了一个汽车供应链，在这个供应链中，制造商和零售商在政府的报废计划下向市场提供节能汽车。该方案向每一位以旧换新的节能汽车的消费者提供补贴，如果制造商对新汽车的建议零售价（MSRP）不超过一个截止水平。我们得出的条件，确保制造商有激励资格的程序，并发现，当截止水平低，制造商可能不愿意有资格的程序，即使补贴是高的。我们还表明，当制造商有资格参加该计划，提高MSRP截止水平将提高制造商的预期利润，但可能会降低预期销售。适度的截止水平可以最大限度地提高计划在刺激节能汽车销售方面的效果，而足够高的截止水平可以为制造商带来最大的利润。当制造商选择有资格参加该计划时，零售商的利润总是增加。此外，我们计算了政府的最佳MSRP截止水平和补贴给定的销售目标，并发现随着计划预算的增加，政府应该提高补贴，但降低MSRP截止水平，以最大限度地提高销售。
We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve a market with a fuel-efficient automobile under a scrappage program by the government. The program awards a subsidy to each consumer who trades in his or her used automobile with a new fuel-efficient automobile, if the manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP) for the new one does not exceed a cutoff level. We derive the conditions assuring that the manufacturer has an incentive to qualify for the program, and find that when the cutoff level is low, the manufacturer may be unwilling to qualify for the program even if the subsidy is high. We also show that when the manufacturer qualifies for the program, increasing the MSRP cutoff level would raise the manufacturer’s expected profit but may decrease the expected sales. A moderate cutoff level can maximize the effectiveness of the program in stimulating the sales of fuel-efficient automobiles, whereas a sufficiently high cutoff level can result in the largest profit for the manufacturer. The retailer’s profit always increases when the manufacturer chooses to qualify for the program. Furthermore, we compute the government’s optimal MSRP cutoff level and subsidy for a given sales target, and find that as the program budget increases, the government should raise the subsidy but reduce the MSRP cutoff level to maximize sales.