On the Interplay between Extortion and Punishment. An Agent Based Model of "Camorra"

On the Interplay between Extortion and Punishment. An Agent Based Model of "Camorra"
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论勒索与惩罚之间的相互作用。

DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Conte
R. Conte
中科院分区：
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文献类型：
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作者：
Barbara Sonzogni;F. Cecconi;R. Conte

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本文提出了一种基于代理的模型，旨在再现人口统计，经济和就业变量的意大利南部地区（坎帕尼亚），其中一个特定的变种勒索敲诈勒索系统（Erss），卡莫拉，是高度活跃和繁荣。一组模拟的初步结果显示了不同程度的勒索和惩罚对赋有社会学习机制的代理人群体的不活动率、就业率等的影响
This paper presents an Agent-Based Model aimed to reproduce the demographics, economic and employment variables of a Southern Italian region (Campania) where one specific variant of Extortion Racketeering Systems (Erss), camorra, is highly active and prosperous. Preliminary results of a set of simulations show the effects of varying levels of extortion and punishment on the rates of inactivity, employment, etc. of a population of agents endowed with social learning mechanisms