THE PRODUCT-MIX AUCTION: A NEW AUCTION DESIGN FOR DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
THE PRODUCT-MIX AUCTION: A NEW AUCTION DESIGN FOR DIFFERENTIATED GOODS
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00523.x
复制
发表时间：
2010-04-01
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Klemperer, Paul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Klemperer, Paul
我描述了一种新的静态（密封投标）拍卖的差异化商品的“产品组合拍卖。“投标人同时对多个资产进行投标，投标人选择跨资产的供应函数。拍卖产生更高的效率，收入，信息和贸易比运行多个单独的拍卖。与同时进行的多轮拍卖相比，它的使用和理解往往更简单，而且不易受到串通的影响。我在2007年北方岩石银行挤兑后设计了它，以帮助英格兰银行对抗信贷紧缩; S.财政部计划使用相关的设计来购买“有毒资产”;它可能被用来购买电力。(JEL：D44、E58）
I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods-the "Product-Mix Auction." Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bid-takers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions. It is also often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a simultaneous multiple round auction. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U. S. Treasury planned using a related design to buy "toxic assets"; it may be used to purchase electricity. (JEL: D44, E58)