Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays
Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays
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承诺策略和其他论文
DOI：
10.1177/009430610803700556
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Kitts
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Kitts
《承诺的策略和其他论文》介绍了诺贝尔奖获得者经济学家托马斯·谢林的多样化作品集，出版商有把握地称他为“过去五十年四五位最重要的社会科学家之一”。这本书包括文章、报告和演讲，主要来自谢林职业生涯的后半段。标题文章整合了谢林从 1978 年到 2001 年撰写的关于承诺的四篇文章。在谢林的博弈论用法中，承诺意味着通过限制自己未来的选择，自愿将自己约束在行动路线上。他指出，承诺是战略性的；我们透明地约束自己的行为，以影响他人对我们的期望，并最终影响他们对我们的行为。例如，前进的军队可能会在过河后烧毁桥梁（向对手发出他们不会撤退的可靠信号），或者枪手可能会单方面解除武装（发出可靠的和解信号）。谢林将承诺理论应用于预期自我控制的问题，或者在偏好的失误或变化的预期中限制一个人未来的选择。例如，“直率的自己”可能会将车钥匙交给朋友，以防止“任性的自己”在聚会后开车回家。作为一名戒烟者，谢林将这一模型广泛应用于戒烟问题。作为一名经济学家，谢林讨论了理性选择理论的多重自我模型的尴尬：我们认为哪些价值观是真实的？一个多面的自我如何最大化她（或他们）的集体效用？该合集包含大量文章，展示了谢林在政策领域的参与，主要是在核武器控制和碳减排方面。谢林关于军备竞赛的著作继承了他在《冲突的战略》（1960）中关于威胁与承诺的经典著作。承诺与本书中的大多数其他实质性问题相关，但对于不专业的读者来说，几乎没有将政策应用与理论联系起来的结缔组织。那些
Strategies of Commitment and Other Essays presents a diverse collection of work by Nobel Laureate economist Thomas Schelling, whom the publisher safely calls " one of the four or five most important social scientists of the past fifty years. " The book includes articles, reports, and speeches, primarily from the last half of Schelling's career. The title essay consolidates four articles that Schelling wrote on commitment from 1978 to 2001. In Schelling's game-theoretic usage, commitment means voluntarily binding oneself to a line of action by limiting one's future choices. He notes that commitment is strategic; we bind our own behavior transparently in order to affect others' expectations of us and ultimately their behavior toward us. For example, an advancing army may burn bridges after crossing (giving a credible signal to an opponent that they will not retreat) or a gunfighter may unilaterally disarm (giving a credible signal of conciliation). Schelling applies commitment theory to the problem of anticipatory self-command, or constraining one's future options in expectation of a lapse or change in preferences. For example, your 'straight self' may give your car keys to a friend to prevent your 'wayward self' from driving home after a party. As a former smoker, Schelling applies this model extensively to the problem of quitting smoking. As an economist, Schelling discusses the awkwardness of this multiple-self model for rational choice theory: Which values do we regard as authentic? How might a multifaceted self maximize her (or their) collective utility? This collection includes numerous essays demonstrating Schelling's engagement in policy arenas, principally in nuclear arms control and carbon abatement. Schelling's work on the arms race follows from his classic work on threats and promises in The Strategy of Conflict (1960). Commitment is related to most other substantive problems in the volume, but there is little connective tissue to link the policy applications to the theory for inexpert readers. Those