Anthropomorphism, primatomorphism, mammalomorphism: understanding cross-species comparisons
Anthropomorphism, primatomorphism, mammalomorphism: understanding cross-species comparisons
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DOI：
10.1007/sbiph-004-0540-4
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发表时间：
2004-09
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
Brian L. Keeley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brian L. Keeley
将非人类动物拟人化是一种谬论的指控本身在很大程度上是误导性的和神话般的。动物行为研究中的拟人论被置于其原始的神学背景中。设定好历史阶段后，我将讨论它与其他一些相关问题的关系：轶事证据的作用、相关拟人论主张的分类、它与一般心理状态归因的关系，以及拟人论指控作为一种绝对主张的性质。然后我认为，对拟人论的分类解读是行不通的，并且当人们声称人类和非人类之间共有特征时，它歪曲了所声称的内容。我们不应将此类主张视为拟人化本身，因为这意味着该特征本质上是人类的，只是派生出的非人类。相反，与哺乳动物共有的特征是哺乳动物形态的，或者灵长类动物共有的特征是灵长类动物。
The charge that anthropomorphizing nonhuman animals is a fallacy is itself largely misguided and mythic. Anthropomorphism in the study of animal behavior is placed in its original, theological context. Having set the historical stage, I then discuss its relationship to a number of other, related issues: the role of anecdotal evidence, the taxonomy of related anthropomorphic claims, its relationship to the attribution of psychological states in general, and the nature of the charge of anthropomorphism as a categorical claim. I then argue that the categorical reading of anthropomorphism cannot work and that it misrepresents what is being claimed when one claims that traits are shared between humans and nonhumans. We should think of such claims not as anthropomorphicper se– because that implies the trait is intrinsically human and only derivatively nonhuman. Instead, traits shared with mammals are mammalomorphic, for example, or primatomorphic when shared by primates.