Stealthy control signal attacks in scalar LQG systems
Stealthy control signal attacks in scalar LQG systems
复制标题
标量 LQG 系统中的隐形控制信号攻击
DOI：
10.1109/globalsip.2015.7418193
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
P. Venkitasubramaniam
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ruochi Zhang;P. Venkitasubramaniam
研究了标量LQG系统中的伪数据注入问题。攻击者损害输入流并修改传输的控制信号，目的是增加控制器产生的二次成本。最优对抗控制信号的特点是有限时域LQG问题下的隐形性/可检测性约束。在二次成本的增加之间的权衡，和数据注入的可检测性，作为衡量合法和伪造的数据动态之间的K-L分歧，推导出解析。最佳对抗控制信号被证明是高斯的方差序列作为系统参数和所需的成本增加的函数。
The problem of false data injection in a scalar LQG system is studied in this work. An attacker compromises the input stream and modifies the control signals transmitted with the objective of increasing the quadratic cost incurred by the controller. The optimal adversarial control signals are characterized for a finite horizon LQG problem under a stealthiness/detectability constraint. The tradeoff between the increase in quadratic cost, and the detectability of data injection, as measured by the K-L divergence between legitimate and falsified data dynamics, is derived analytically. The optimal adversarial control signals are shown to be Gaussian with the sequence of variances derived as a function of system parameters and the desired cost increase.