A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks
A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks
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DOI：
10.3390/g13040055
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发表时间：
2022-08-01
期刊：
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Taylor, Dewey
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Caasi, Jovic Aaron S.;Joseph, Brian M.;Taylor, Dewey
黄热病是一种病媒传播的急性病毒性出血性疾病。它在非洲和拉丁美洲的热带地区流行，但在2016年安哥拉罗安达爆发期间显示出国际传播的潜力。黄热病可以通过接种疫苗、控制病媒和避免蚊虫叮咬来预防。为了解释疾病动力学中的人类行为，我们在最近的黄热病传播房室模型中加入了博弈论成分。自私的人评估感染黄热病的风险，并选择接种疫苗或避免叮咬，以尽量减少总成本。我们发现纳什均衡，最佳水平的疫苗接种和咬伤保护，如果个人可以决定只使用一种预防方法，以及当他们可以决定使用他们两个。在后一种情况下，我们表明，接种疫苗是首选的保护方法，从个人的角度来看，在纳什均衡，个人只使用疫苗。我们的模型预测安哥拉的疫苗接种覆盖率约为65%，这与经验值68%合理吻合。我们还研究自愿预防是否能导致在流行地区消灭这种疾病。我们表明，仅仅自愿接种疫苗不足以减轻疫情的风险，这表明强制性疫苗接种政策是必要的。
Yellow fever is a vector-borne acute viral hemorrhagic disease. It is endemic in tropical areas of Africa and Latin America but demonstrated the potential for international spread during the 2016 outbreak in Luanda, Angola. Yellow fever can be prevented by vaccination, vector control, and avoiding mosquito bites. To account for human behavior in disease dynamics, we add a game-theoretic component to a recent compartmental model of yellow fever transmission. The self-interested individuals evaluate the risks of contracting yellow fever and choose to vaccinate or avoid the bites to minimize the overall costs. We find the Nash equilibria, the optimal levels of vaccination and bite protections if the individuals can decide on the use of only one of the prevention methods as well as when they can decide on the use of both of them. In the later case, we show that vaccination is the preferred method of protection from the individual standpoint and, in the Nash equilibrium, individuals use vaccination only. Our model predicts the vaccination coverage in Angola to be around 65%, which is in reasonable agreement with the empirical value of 68%. We also study whether voluntary prevention can lead to the elimination of the disease in endemic areas. We show that voluntary vaccination alone is not enough to mitigate the risks of outbreaks, suggesting that a mandatory vaccination policy is necessary.