On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
复制标题
论事后个人理性下的有效合伙解散
DOI：
10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Nozomu Muto and Daisuke Oyama
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Stefano Galavotti;Nozomu Muto and Daisuke Oyama
本文研究的是估值相互依赖的情况下，合伙企业的事后理性、有效的解散。我们得到了一个充分条件，确保存在一个有效的解散机制，该机制满足贝叶斯激励相容、事后预算平衡和事后个人理性。对于同等份额的合伙企业，我们证明了当估值的相互依赖为非正时，我们的充分条件对任何对称型分布都是满足的。这一结果改进了以往的存在结果，表明对事后个体理性的更强要求并不总是排除效率。我们还表明，如果我们允许两阶段揭示机制，其中代理人报告他们从分配中实现的收益，以及在均衡路径上施加惩罚，即使相互依赖是正的，有效的解散也总是可能的。我们进一步讨论了有事后解雇权的有效解散的可能性。
This paper studies ex post individually rational, efficient partnership dissolution in a setting with interdependent valuations. We derive a sufficient condition that ensures the existence of an efficient dissolution mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex post budget balancedness, and ex post individual rationality. For equal-share partnerships, we show that our sufficient condition is satisfied for any symmetric type distribution whenever the interdependence in valuations is non-positive. This result improves former existence results, demonstrating that the stronger requirement of ex post individual rationality does not always rule out efficiency. We also show that if we allow for two-stage revelation mechanisms, in which agents report their realized payoffs from the allocation, as well as imposing penalties off the equilibrium path, efficient dissolution is always possible even when the interdependence is positive. We further discuss the possibility of efficient dissolution with ex post quitting rights.