Leakage-Resilient Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proof System and One-Time Lossy Filter
Leakage-Resilient Chosen-Ciphertext Secure Public-Key Encryption from Hash Proof System and One-Time Lossy Filter
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-42045-0_20
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发表时间：
2013-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Baodong Qin;Shengli Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Baodong Qin;Shengli Liu
我们提出了一种新的公共密钥加密（PKE）方案的通用结构，该方案可防止来自任何哈希证明系统（HPS）和任何一次性有损滤波器（OT-LF）的弹性泄漏选择密文攻击（LR-CCA）。基于DDH和DCR假设的hps和OT-LFs的有效构建表明，我们的构建是一种实用的LR-CCA安全性方法。大多数具有LR-CCA安全性的实用pke，如Cramer-Shoup方案的变体，都源于哈希证明系统，但泄漏率最多为1/4−0(1)（定义为泄漏量与秘钥大小的比率）。我们根据DDH和DCR假设构建的实例导致泄漏率为1/2−0(1)的LR-CCA安全pke。另一方面，我们的构建也为构建IND-CCA安全（无泄漏）PKE方案创造了一种新的方法，这可能是独立的兴趣。
We present a new generic construction of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against leakage-resilient chosen-ciphertext attacks (LR-CCA), from any Hash Proof System (HPS) and any one-time lossy filter (OT-LF). Efficient constructions of HPSs and OT-LFs from the DDH and DCR assumptions suggest that our construction is a practical approach to LR-CCA security. Most of practical PKEs with LR-CCA security, like variants of Cramer-Shoup scheme, rooted from Hash Proof Systems, but with leakage rates at most 1/4 −o(1) (defined as the ratio of leakage amount to secret-key size). The instantiations of our construction from the DDH and DCR assumptions result in LR-CCA secure PKEs with leakage rate of 1/2 −o(1). On the other hand, our construction also creates a new approach for constructing IND-CCA secure (leakage-free) PKE schemes, which may be of independent interest.