Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences
复制标题
一维单峰偏好的策略证明概率决策方案
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2829
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ton Storcken
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Lars Ehlers;H. Peters;Ton Storcken
摘要集体决策问题被认为是有限数量的代理人谁有单峰偏好的真实的线。概率决策方案将真实的线上的概率分布分配给所报告的偏好的每个简档。本文的主要结果是一类的一致性和策略证明概率方案的援助固定的概率分布，发挥类似的作用，在H。Moulin（Public Choice 35（1980），437-455）.从而将Moulin（1980）的工作推广到概率框架。经济文献分类号：D 71、D81。
Abstract Collective decision problems are considered with a finite number of agents who have single-peaked preferences on the real line. A probabilistic decision scheme assigns a probability distribution over the real line to every profile of reported preferences. The main result of the paper is a characterization of the class of unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic schemes with the aid of fixed probability distributions that play a role similar to that of the phantom voters in H. Moulin ( Public Choice 35 (1980), 437–455). Thereby, the work of Moulin (1980) is extended to the probabilistic framework. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D71, D81.