Phenomenology as a Resource for Patients
Phenomenology as a Resource for Patients
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DOI：
10.1093/jmp/jhs008
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发表时间：
2012-04-01
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Carel, Havi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Carel, Havi
患者支持工具涉及多种学科，包括心理治疗、社会心理学和社会护理。迄今为止还没有被用来支持病人的一门学科是哲学。本文提出了一种特殊的哲学方法，现象学，可以证明对病人有用，给他们反思和扩大他们对疾病的理解的工具。我提出了一个资源框架，可以帮助病人哲学地审视他们的疾病，它对他们生活的影响，以及它的意义。我解释了对这种资源的需要，为它提供了哲学基础，并概述了哲学提供的认识论和存在主义收益。疾病往往开始时是对一个人生活的侵扰，但随着时间的推移，它变成了一种存在方式。我认为，这种转变影响了人类的核心特征，如对空间和时间的体验、人类的能力和适应性。因此，它需要哲学的分析和回应。本文使用胡塞尔和梅洛-庞蒂的思想，以现象学工具包的形式为患者提供这样的回应。该工具包包括将疾病视为现象学还原的一种形式，将疾病主题化，并将疾病视为改变患者在世界上的存在。我建议这个工具包可以作为一个研讨会提供给病人，使用现象学概念、文本和电影片段来反思疾病。我的结论是，将疾病作为具身存在的一个极限案例来考察，加深了我们对现象学的理解。
Patient support tools have drawn on a variety of disciplines, including psychotherapy, social psychology, and social care. One discipline that has not so far been used to support patients is philosophy. This paper proposes that a particular philosophical approach, phenomenology, could prove useful for patients, giving them tools to reflect on and expand their understanding of their illness. I present a framework for a resource that could help patients to philosophically examine their illness, its impact on their life, and its meaning. I explain the need for such a resource, provide philosophical grounding for it, and outline the epistemic and existential gains philosophy offers. Illness often begins as an intrusion on one's life but with time becomes a way of being. I argue that this transition impacts on core human features such as the experience of space and time, human abilities, and adaptability. It therefore requires philosophical analysis and response. The paper uses ideas from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to present such a response in the form of a phenomenological toolkit for patients. The toolkit includes viewing illness as a form of phenomenological reduction, thematizing illness, and examining illness as altering the ill person's being in the world. I suggest that this toolkit could be offered to patients as a workshop, using phenomenological concepts, texts, and film clips to reflect on illness. I conclude by arguing that examining illness as a limit case of embodied existence deepens our understanding of phenomenology.