Shareholder Wealth Effects in Equity REIT Restructuring Transactions: Sell-offs, Mergers and Joint Ventures
Shareholder Wealth Effects in Equity REIT Restructuring Transactions: Sell-offs, Mergers and Joint Ventures
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股权 REIT 重组交易中的股东财富效应：出售、合并和合资企业
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发表时间：
2009
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通讯作者：
Robert D. Campbell
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文献类型：
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作者：
Robert D. Campbell
摘要股权型房地产投资信托（EREITS）的制度环境限制使得重大重组成为其战略规划中比其他公司更重要的方面。本研究考察了有关房地产投资信托重组活动的四大类文献：(1)出售财产；（二）与其他房地产投资信托基金合并；（三）与民营企业合并；（四）合资企业。房地产投资信托基金中这些形式的重组所产生的财富效应不同于传统公司。该EREIT的使用伞合伙REIT （UPREIT）的组织形式也进行了审查，因为它是密切相关的公司的重组战略。众所周知，采用股权房地产信托1组织形式的决定意味着对房地产投资现金流的管理控制的重大约束（Damodaran, John and Liu, 1997）。其中最重要的是对资产性质的限制，以及对收益处置的限制。至少95%的REIT收益必须来自房地产或证券，并且至少90%的收益必须根据公认会计原则每年支付给股东。在2001年之前，这一支付要求是95%。正如Damodaran、John和Liu（1997）所指出的，这些限制使得REIT管理者更难以积累现金储备来为新的投资融资。对于寻求增长和扩张的REIT经理来说，这种情况降低了第一等级（留存收益）的重要性，并增加了管理层对资本市场纪律的敞口。对于寻求更高流动性水平的REITs来说，这意味着它们通过保留收益来解决流动性问题的能力减弱。限制性制度环境对房地产投资信托基金的一个影响是，合同重组安排对它们来说可能是战略规划中比大多数其他公司重要得多的组成部分。对于寻求扩张的REITs，以股票和/或债务承担融资的重组安排可能会降低交易成本，并提供公开市场的替代方案。对于寻求增加流动性的REITs，处置财产以换取现金或其他流动资产可能会解决公司无法保留收益所造成的问题。本研究考察了关于房地产投资信托基金使用的四种重要重组的文献现状：(1)主要的财产配置；（二）与其他房地产投资信托基金合并；（三）与民营企业合并；（四）合资企业。它还审查了关于伞形合伙房地产投资信托基金（UPREIT）组织形式的文献，这种组织形式在重要方面与重组有关，特别是在收购私营公司方面。这些形式的重组对房地产投资信托基金和传统公司的财富效应总结在表1中。房地产的出售出售是对资产的主要处置，随后出售公司继续经营。这些交易有时被称为“部分出售”，以区别于完全清算和现金融资合并。传统公司的资产抛售在文献中观察到的一个一致的模式是，公司出售显著有利于出售公司的股东，而对购买者的财富效应则不太明显。Jain（1985）测试了1976-1978年间超过1000次的抛售，发现在公告日期前后的两天窗口内，买家和卖家的异常回报都是显著正的，但卖家的异常回报更高，为+0.7%。Hite， Owers和Rogers（1987）在1971-1981年的55次抛售样本中发现，在两天的时间窗口内，卖家的回报率甚至更高，为+ 1.7%。．..
Abstract The restrictions of the institutional environment for Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (EREITS) causes major restructuring to be a more important aspect of strategic planning for EREITs than it is for other firms. This study examines the literature regarding four major categories of EREIT restructuring activity: (1) sell-offs of property; (2) mergers with other REITs; (3) mergers with privately-held entities; and (4) joint ventures. The wealth effects of these forms of restructuring in REITs are different from those observed in conventional corporations. The EREIT's use of the Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) form of organization is also examined, because it is closely related to the firm's restructuring strategy. Introduction It is well-known that the decision to adopt the Equity Real Estate Trust1 form of organization implies significant constraints on managerial control of cash flows from real property investments (Damodaran, John and Liu, 1997). The most significant of these are restrictions on the nature of assets, and restrictions on the disposition of earnings. At least 95% of REIT earnings must be derived from real estate or securities, and at least 90% of earnings as determined in accordance with generally-accepted accounting principles must be paid out to shareholders each year. Prior to 2001, this payout requirement was 95%. As Damodaran, John and Liu (1997) point out, these restrictions make it more difficult for REIT managers to accumulate cash reserves to finance new investments. For REIT managers seeking growth and expansion, this circumstance reduces the importance of the first level of the pecking order (retained earnings), and increases management's exposure to the discipline of capital markets. For REITs seeking higher levels of liquidity, it means that they experience a diminished capacity to solve liquidity problems by retaining earnings. One implication of the restrictive institutional environment for REITs is that contractual restructuring arrangements may be a much more important component of strategic planning for them than it is for most other firms. For REITs seeking to expand, restructuring arrangements financed with stock and/or debt assumption may reduce transaction costs and provide an alternative to public markets. For REITs seeking to increase liquidity, dispositions of property in exchange for cash or other liquid assets may solve a problem created by the firm's inability to retain earnings. This study examines the current state of the literature with regard to four important kinds of restructuring used by EREITs: (1) major dispositions of property; (2) mergers with other REITs; (3) mergers with privately-held entities; and (4) joint ventures. It also examines the literature with regard to the Umbrella Partnership REIT (UPREIT) form of organization, which is related to restructuring in important ways, especially with regard to the acquisition of private firms. The wealth effects of these forms of restructuring, both for REITs and for conventional firms, are summarized in Exhibit 1. Sell-offs of Real Property A sell-off is a major disposition of assets, following which the selling firm continues to operate. These transactions are sometimes called "partial sell-offs," to distinguish them from total liquidations and cash-financed mergers. Asset Sell-offs by Conventional Corporations A consistent pattern observed in the literature is that corporate sell-offs significantly benefit the selling firm's shareholders, while wealth effects for purchasers are less clear. Jain (1985) tests more than 1000 sell-offs from 1976-1978 and finds that abnormal returns in a two-day window around the announcement date are significantly positive both for buyers and sellers, but higher for sellers at +0.7%. Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) find even larger seller returns of + 1.7% in a two-day window for a sample of fifty-five sell-offs from 1971-1981. …