Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological Naturalism”

Mental Causation in Searle’s “Biological Naturalism”
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塞尔“生物自然主义”中的心理因果关系

DOI:
10.2307/2108318
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发表时间:
1995
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Jaegwon Kim
Jaegwon Kim
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文献类型:
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作者:
Jaegwon Kim

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塞尔称之为“生物自然主义。书中还提供了许多其他“简单”、“容易”和“显而易见”的解决方案,例如,其他心灵(76)、意识(93)和还原论(18)的问题。正如你所预料的那样,坏消息是,这些解决方案似乎都不简单或明显;至少在身心问题的情况下,塞尔的解决方案给我的印象是充满了模糊性和困难--这些都不是真正的新问题。塞尔的书中有很多令人耳目一新和鼓舞人心的地方,而且,在一些重要的问题上,特别是在认知科学研究的所谓属性的问题上,即形式/计算属性据称是从认知代理的物理/生物学性质中抽象出来的,我们基本上是同情的,如果不是完全同意的话。但我认为,他的生物自然主义,为他提供了基本的形而上学方案,需要从根本上重新思考。可能真的有一个简单的解决身心问题的方法,但我不认为我们在塞尔的生物自然主义中找到它。为什么几乎每个人都错过了塞尔的简单解决方案,据他说,已经盯着我们的脸一百年了?根据塞尔对心灵哲学历史的叙述,这是因为我们大多数人,包括当代唯物主义者和功能主义者,仍然处于
Searle calls it "biological naturalism." Many other "simple," "easy," and "obvious" solutions are offered throughout the book, for example, to the problems of other minds (76), consciousness (93), and reductionism (18). The bad news, as you would expect, is that none of these solutions seem either simple or obvious; at least in the case of the mind-body problem, Searle's solution strikes me as fraught with ambiguities and difficulties-of the sorts that are not really new. There is much in Searle's book that I find refreshing and stimulating, and, on some important points-in particular, on the issue of the purported properties studied by cognitive science, namely formal/computational properties allegedly abstracted out of the physical/biological nature of cognitive agents-we are in basic sympathy, if not full agreement. But I believe that his biological naturalism, which provides the basic metaphysical scheme for him, needs to be rethought from the ground up. There might really be a simple solution to the mind-body problem, but I don't think we find it in Searle's biological naturalism. Why has practically everyone missed Searle's simple solution that, according to him, has been staring us in the face for a hundred years? According to Searle's recounting of the history of philosophy of mind, it's because most of us, including contemporary materialists and functionalists, are still in the