MARKET INSURANCE, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SELF-PROTECTION
MARKET INSURANCE, SELF-INSURANCE, AND SELF-PROTECTION
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DOI：
10.1086/259916
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发表时间：
1972-01-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
BECKER, GS
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
EHRLICH, I;BECKER, GS
本文发展了一种保险需求理论，强调市场保险、“自我保险”和“自我保护”之间的相互作用。“价格”、收入和其他变量的变化对这些替代形式的保险需求的影响，使用“国家偏好”方法来分析不确定性下的行为。市场保险和自我保险被证明是相互替代的，但市场保险和自我保护可以互补。该分析挑战了“道德风险”是市场保险不可避免的后果的观念，表明在某些条件下，后者可能导致危险事件概率的降低。保险激励及其行为含义通常是用期望效用方法来分析的，而没有参考消费理论中通常使用的无差异曲线分析。在本文中，通过结合期望效用和无差异曲线分析，在不确定性下（与世界状态有关的偏好）行为的“状态偏好”方法的背景下讨论保险。我们用这个框架来重申
The article develops a theory of demand for insurance that emphasizes the interaction between market insurance," self-insurance," and" self-protection." The effects of changes in" prices," income, and other variables on the demand for these alternative forms of insurance are analyzed using the" state preference" approach to behavior under uncertainty. Market insurance and self-insurance are shown to be substitutes, but market insurance and self-protection can be complements. The analysis challenges the notion that" moral hazard" is an inevitable consequence of market insurance, by showing that under certain conditions the latter may lead to a reduction in the probabilities of hazardous events.The incentive to insure and its behavioral implications have usually been analyzed by applying the expected utility approach without reference to the indifference curve analysis ordinarily employed in consumption theory. In this paper insurance is discussed by combining expected utility and an indifference urve analysis within the context of the" state preference" approach to behavior under uncertainty (the preferences in question relating to states of the world).'We use this framework to restate