Coalition Analysis on Two Manufactures and Two Retailers Supply Chain via Cooperative Game Theory
Coalition Analysis on Two Manufactures and Two Retailers Supply Chain via Cooperative Game Theory
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基于合作博弈论的两个制造商和两个零售商供应链的联盟分析
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-85906-0_67
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Nishi Tatsushi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Saso Taiki;Nishi Tatsushi
本文研究了两个制造商和两个零售商价格竞争的分散供应链模型的定价问题。在定价博弈中，我们分析了完全竞争、大联盟和制造商与零售商部分合作的均衡解。结果表明，外部性之间的联盟供应链成员。因此，定价博弈被表示为一个分区函数博弈。基于配分函数博弈的合作博弈理论，得到了各联盟结构中稳定的利益分配。我们得到了一个新的发现：如果在同一联盟结构中存在多个部分联盟，则部分联盟内的利润小于只有一个部分联盟时的利润。结果表明，当产品替代性较低，商店替代性较高时，制造商的悲观Shapley值和乐观Shapley值均低于制造商的乐观个人联盟值。
In this study, we consider a coalition analysis on the pricing problem for a decentralized supply chain model in which two manufacturers and two retailers with price competitions. In the pricing game, we analyze the equilibrium solutions with perfect competition, grand coalition and partial cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. The results show the externality between coalitions for supply chain members. Therefore, the pricing game is represented as a partition function game. The stable profit allocation in each alliance structure is obtained based on cooperative game theory for the partition function game. We derive the new finding that if there are multiple partial alliances within the same alliance structure, the profit within the partial alliance is smaller than the profit when there is only one partial alliance. Then, it is shown that the pessimistic and optimistic Shapley values of the manufacturers are lower than the optimistic personal alliance value of the manufacturer when the product substitutability is lower and the store substitutability is higher.