A Defense of Stable Invariantism
A Defense of Stable Invariantism
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稳定不变论的辩护
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发表时间：
2010
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通讯作者：
Baron Reed
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作者：
Baron Reed
一个真正的信仰和一个被算作知识的信仰都可能是实际有用的。但正如柏拉图在《梅诺》中告诉我们的那样，它们之间的重要区别是，只有知识才有一条“系绳”，这样它就不会逃脱。知识是相当稳定的这一普遍感觉一直是认识论传统的一个持久的部分--直到最近。一些当前流行的观点--语境主义和对主体敏感的不变论--的结果是，一个人是否可以正确地说拥有知识可能会突然改变，即使她的证据或可靠性没有变化。这些观点之所以被接受，很大程度上是因为它们被认为为旧的认识论问题提供了解决方案。但是，正如我将在下文中论述的那样，治疗比疾病更糟糕。这些观点的创新方面要么行不通，要么破坏了我们对知识的兴趣。一种更令人满意的观点，我称之为稳定不变主义，为这些问题提供了解决方案，这些问题仅仅源于几乎每个认识论都认同的对易错误论的基本承诺。
A true belief and a belief that counts as knowledge can both be practically useful. But the important difference between them, as Plato tells us in the Meno, is that only knowledge has a "tether" so that it cannot run away. The general sense that knowledge is fairly stable has been an enduring part of the epistemological tradition—until recently. Some currently popular views—contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism—have the consequence that whether someone can correctly be said to have knowledge can change abruptly, even when there is no change in her evidence or reliability. These views are embraced in large part because they are thought to provide solutions to old epistemological problems. But, as I shall argue below, the cure is worse than the disease. The innovative aspects of these views either do not work or undermine our interest in knowledge. A more satisfying view, which I shall call stable invariantism, offers solutions to these problems derived simply from the basic commitment to fallibilism that virtually every epistemologist shares.