Preferences, entry, and market structure

Preferences, entry, and market structure
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偏好、进入和市场结构

DOI:
10.1111/1756-2171.12155
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发表时间:
2016
期刊:
The RAND Journal of Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Federico Etro
Federico Etro
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
P. Bertoletti;Federico Etro

文献摘要

被引文献

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当偏好在有限但内生的商品数量上对称时,我们提供了一个统一的方法来处理不完全(垄断、伯特兰和古诺)竞争。加价取决于森岛的替代弹性和品种数量。研究了自由进入均衡的比较静力学,建立了关于收入、市场规模和生产率的加价中立的条件。我们比较了内生市场结构和最优市场结构的几个非消费电子产品的例子。在广义线性直接效用下,在垄断竞争下,加价可以是常数和最优的;在Bertrand和Cournot竞争下,加价可以是非单调的。
We provide a unified approach to imperfect (monopolistic, Bertrand, and Cournot) competition when preferences are symmetric over a finite but endogenous number of goods. Markups depend on the Morishima elasticity of substitution and on the number of varieties. The comparative statics of free-entry equilibria is examined, establishing the conditions for markup neutrality with respect to income, market size, and productivity. We compare endogenous and optimal market structures for several non-CES examples. With a generalized linear direct utility, the markup can be constant and optimal under monopolistic competition, and nonmonotonic in the number of firms under Bertrand or Cournot competition.