On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions
On the distinction of empathic and vicarious emotions
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DOI：
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00196
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发表时间：
2013-05-15
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Krach, Soeren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paulus, Frieder M.;Mueller-Pinzler, Laura;Krach, Soeren
在特刊《替代体验的神经基础》的导言中，编辑们指出，一个人“在目睹他人社交失礼时可能会感到尴尬”。在我们的评论中，我们讨论了这一说法，并询问这个例子是否引入了一种替代或共情形式的尴尬。我们详细阐述了这两种形式的情感体验之间的共性和差异，并讨论了它们的潜在机制。我们认为，代理和共情情绪都源于依赖于锚定和调整的镜像和心智化模拟过程。我们认为，“共情情感”一词仅适用于感知者和社会目标具有共同情感体验的事件，而“替代情感”则提供了更广泛的范围，也包括非共享情感体验。两者都被认为在社会交往中有很高的功能。
In the introduction to the special issue "The Neural Underpinnings of Vicarious Experience" the editors state that one "may feel embarrassed when witnessing another making a social faux pas". In our commentary we address this statement and ask whether this example introduces a vicarious or an empathic form of embarrassment. We elaborate commonalities and differences between these two forms of emotional experiences and discuss their underlying mechanisms. We suggest that both, vicarious and empathic emotions, originate from the simulation processes mirroring and mentalizing that depend on anchoring and adjustment. We claim the term "empathic emotion" to be reserved exclusively for incidents where perceivers and social targets have shared affective experience, whereas "vicarious emotion" offers a wider scope and also includes non-shared affective experiences. Both are supposed to be highly functional in social interactions.