Education, life expectancy and family bargaining: the Ben-Porath effect revisited
Education, life expectancy and family bargaining: the Ben-Porath effect revisited
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DOI：
10.1080/09645292.2013.869557
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发表时间：
2015-01-01
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Ponthiere, Gregory
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Leker, Laura;Ponthiere, Gregory
继本-波拉特[1967年。“人力资本的生产和收益的生命周期。“Journal of Political Economy 75（3）：352-365]，预期寿命对教育和人力资本的影响引起了增长理论家的广泛关注。鉴于现有的增长模型依赖于由孩子或他的父母做出的教育决定，我们通过将教育建模为父母和孩子之间讨价还价的结果来重新审视本-波拉特效应。我们开发了一个三阶段的世代重叠（OLG）模型，人力资本增加预期寿命，并表明，由于父母和子女面临的不平等的剩余寿命，本-波拉特效应的形式取决于讨价还价的权力是如何在家庭内部分配，这反过来又影响长期的经济动态。使用16个经合组织国家（1940-1980年）的数据，我们表明，引入家庭谈判有助于合理化所观察到的教育模式在各国。
Following Ben-Porath [1967. "The Production of Human Capital and the LifeCycle of Earnings."Journal of Political Economy 75 (3): 352-365], the influence of life expectancy on education and on human capital has attracted much attention among growth theorists. Whereas existing growth models rely on an education decision made either by the child or by his parent, we revisit the Ben-Porath effect by modelling education as the outcome of bargaining between the parent and the child. We develop a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model, where human capital increases life expectancy and shows that as a result of the unequal remaining lifetimes faced by parents and children, the form of the Ben-Porath effect depends on how bargaining power is distributed within the family, which in turn affects long-run economic dynamics. Using data on 16 OECD countries (1940-1980), we show that introducing family bargaining helps to rationalize the observed education patterns across countries.