AFFECT, COGNITION, AND AWARENESS - AFFECTIVE PRIMING WITH OPTIMAL AND SUBOPTIMAL STIMULUS EXPOSURES
AFFECT, COGNITION, AND AWARENESS - AFFECTIVE PRIMING WITH OPTIMAL AND SUBOPTIMAL STIMULUS EXPOSURES
复制标题
DOI：
10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.723
复制
发表时间：
1993-05-01
影响因子：
7.6
通讯作者：
ZAJONC, RB
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
MURPHY, ST;ZAJONC, RB
情感首因假说（R. B. Zajonc, 1980）认为，积极和消极的情感反应可以在最小的刺激输入和几乎不需要认知加工的情况下被唤起。本研究通过比较情感启动和认知启动在极短（次优）和较长（最佳）暴露时间下的效果来验证这一假设。在次优暴露条件下，只有情感启动对新刺激的判断产生显著的变化。这些结果表明，当情感在意识意识之外被唤起时，它是弥漫的和非特异性的，它的起源和地址是不可接近的。由于极少的认知参与，这种粗大和非特异性的情感反应因此可以扩散或转移到不相关的刺激上。在最佳暴露下，这种模式的结果被逆转，只有认知启动才会产生重大的判断变化。总之，这些结果支持情感首要假设。
The affective primacy hypothesis (R. B. Zajonc, 1980) asserts that positive and negative affective reactions can be evoked with minimal stimulus input and virtually no cognitive processing. The present work tested this hypothesis by comparing the effects of affective and cognitive priming under extremely brief (suboptimal) and longer (optimal) exposure durations. At suboptimal exposures only affective primes produced significant shifts in Ss' judgments of novel stimuli. These results suggest that when affect is elicited outside of conscious awareness, it is diffuse and nonspecific, and its origin and address are not accessible. Having minimal cognitive participation, such gross and nonspecific affective reactions can therefore be diffused or displaced onto unrelated stimuli. At optimal exposures this pattern of results was reversed such that only cognitive primes produced significant shifts in judgments. Together, these results support the affective primacy hypothesis.