OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN CONGLOMERATES:FACTS AND HYPOTHESES FOR GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF CHILEAN CONGLOMERATES:FACTS AND HYPOTHESES FOR GOVERNANCE
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智利企业集团的所有权和资本结构：治理的事实和假设
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
E. Walker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Lefort;E. Walker
在本文中，我们对智利企业集团的合并所有权和资本结构进行了准确的描述性分析，强调了这些结构对公司治理的影响。我们避免重复计算通过传销进行的投资，并考虑在 Superintendencia de Seguros y Valores (SVS) 注册的非金融公司的范围。我们发现，经济集团是智利企业结构的主要形式，而智利企业集团中控制权与现金流权分离的最常见方式是通过传销。事实证明，这些计划在筹集外部资金方面取得了成功。智利企业集团的控制人依靠相对较少的人来开展业务，并且这些人仅作为集团附属公司的董事会成员参与其中。然而，智利企业集团的控制人持有的股权多于严格控制所需的股权，这表明与子公司相关的现金流收益相对较大。最后，养老基金和美国存托凭证构成了智利集团的重要少数股东。
In this paper we provide an accurate descriptive analysis of consolidated ownership and capital structures in Chilean conglomerates, emphasizing the implications of these structures for corporate governance. We avoid double counting investments made through pyramid schemes, and consider the universe of non-financial firms registered at the Superintendencia de Seguros y Valores (SVS). We find that economic groups are the predominant form of corporate structure in Chile, and that the most common way of separating control from cash-flow rights in Chilean conglomerates is through pyramid schemes. These schemes have proven to be successful in raising external funding. Controllers of Chilean conglomerates rely in a relatively small number of people in order to conduct business, and these people participate exclusively as board members of corporations affiliated to their group. However, controllers of Chilean conglomerates hold more equity than strictly needed for control, suggesting that cash-flow benefits associated to subsidiaries are relatively large. Finally, pension funds and ADRs constitute a significant minority shareholder in Chilean groups.