Centralized resource planning and Yardstick competition
Centralized resource planning and Yardstick competition
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DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2011.10.005
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发表时间：
2013-02
影响因子：
6.9
通讯作者：
Armin Varmaz;Andreas Varwig;Thorsten Poddig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Armin Varmaz;Andreas Varwig;Thorsten Poddig
多部门和分散的公司往往运作效率低下。在大多数情况下，中央管理层影响其分支机构行为的手段有限。尽管相对绩效评估被认为在定义激励机制方面非常有用，但这种方法不能轻易转移到内部绩效管理中。我们通过改变绩效评估的角度来处理这个问题。基于最近引入的CRA-DEA模型，我们开发了一个新的超效率的措施，使建立有目的的组织内激励机制。通过一个数值例子，分析德国零售银行的业绩，我们的措施的适用性，并与标准的DEA模型。集中式超效率似乎能够满足组织内绩效管理的特定需求。
Multidivisional and decentralized firms often operate inefficiently. In most cases, central management's instruments to influence its branches' behavior are limited. Although relative performance evaluation has been argued to be of great use in defining incentive mechanisms, such approaches cannot be transferred easily to internal performance management. We approach this issue by changing the perspective of performance evaluation. Based on the recently introduced CRA-DEA model, we develop a new super-efficiency measure that enables to establish purposive intra-organizational incentive mechanisms. By means of a numerical example, analyzing the performance of a German retail bank, the applicability of our measure is shown and compared to standard DEA models. Centralized super-efficiency seems able to suit the specific needs of intra-organizational performance management.