Target Information Trading - An Economic Perspective of Security
Target Information Trading - An Economic Perspective of Security
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-37231-6_7
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发表时间：
2019-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jing Hou;Li Sun;Tao Shu;Husheng Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jing Hou;Li Sun;Tao Shu;Husheng Li
充分的证据证实了信息在安全中的重要性。虽然很多安全博弈研究都假设攻击者的观察能力有限，无法获取目标信息，但很少有研究考虑到从数据经纪人那里获取信息的可能性，更不用说探索这种信息服务在隐蔽的地下社会中的牟利行为。研究了当目标信息被数据代理出售给多个竞争攻击者时，信息在安全问题中的作用。我们制定了一个新的多阶段博弈模型来描述数据代理和攻击者之间的合作和竞争互动。具体来说，攻击者的竞争与购买和攻击决策相关联，被建模为两阶段随机模型；在Stackelberg博弈中分析了数据代理与攻击者之间的讨价还价过程。得到了攻击者的竞争均衡解和数据代理的最优定价策略。我们的研究结果表明，在信息交易中，即使信息价格过高，攻击者也会面临更大的风险；目标值越高，信息精度越有价值。此外，这种竞争可能会削弱信息对攻击者的价值，而对数据代理有利。该研究通过刻画具有劳动专业化的攻击者的合作竞争行为，从经济学角度提供信息价值的定量度量，从而促进对营利性地下社区的更好理解，从而为文献做出了贡献。
Ample evidence has confirmed the importance of information in security. While much research on security game has assumed the attackers’ limited observation capabilities to obtain target information, few work considers the possibility that the information can be acquired from a data broker, not to mention exploring the profit-seeking behaviors of such an information service in the shrouded underground society. This paper studies the role of information in security problem when the target information is sold by a data broker to multiple competitive attackers. We formulate a novel multi-stage game model to characterize both the cooperative and competitive interactions of the data broker and attackers. Specifically, the attacker competition with correlated purchasing and attacking decisions is modeled as a two-stage stochastic model; and the bargaining process between the data broker and the attackers is analyzed in a Stackelberg game. Both the attackers’ competitive equilibrium solutions and data broker’s optimal pricing strategy are obtained. Our results show that with information trading, the target suffers from larger risks even when the information price is too high to benefit the attackers; and the information accuracy is more valuable when the target value is higher. Furthermore, the competition may weaken the information value to the attackers but benefit the data broker. The study contributes to the literature by characterizing the co-opetitive behaviors of the attackers with labor specialization, providing quantitative measures of information value from an economic perspective, and thus promoting a better understanding of the profit-seeking underground community.