In view of ratification:: Governmental preferences and domestic constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference
In view of ratification:: Governmental preferences and domestic constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference
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DOI：
10.1162/002081802320005531
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发表时间：
2002-03-01
影响因子：
7.8
通讯作者：
König, T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hug, S;König, T
阿姆斯特丹政府间会议的谈判产物--《阿姆斯特丹条约》--将草案提案缩减为欧盟所有15个成员国的共识。使用两个层次的国际讨价还价的概念，我们提供了一个彻底的分析，这一共识集是如何达成的问题减法国内批准的限制。利用涵盖所有谈判参与者和批准国家政党立场的数据集，我们首先强调欧盟15个成员国在阿姆斯特丹批准程序中的差异。通过这一分析，我们可以比较各国在批准方面的不同困难。其次，我们对条约谈判的实证分析表明，成员国排除了一半的阿姆斯特丹谈判问题，以确保顺利批准。由于在阿姆斯特丹政府间会议上，国内批准限制较高的成员国在消除令人不安的问题方面表现得更好，因此谈判者受到国内利益限制的程度可以解释问题减法。
The bargaining product of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference-the Amsterdam Treaty-dwindled down the draft proposal to a consensus set of all fifteen member states of the European Union (EU). Using the two-level concept of international bargains, we provide a thorough analysis of how this consensus set was reached by issue subtraction with respect to domestic ratification constraints. Drawing on data sets covering the positions of all negotiating actors and ratifying national political parties, we first highlight the differences in the Amsterdam ratification procedures in the fifteen member states of the EU. This analysis allows us to compare the varying ratification difficulties in each country. Second, our empirical analysis of the treaty negotiations shows that member states excluded half of the Amsterdam bargaining issues to secure a smooth ratification. Because member states with higher domestic ratification constraints performed better in eliminating uncomfortable issues at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference, issue subtraction can be explained by the extent to which the negotiators were constrained by domestic interests.