Do diplomatic visits promote official development aid? Evidence from Japan
Do diplomatic visits promote official development aid? Evidence from Japan
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DOI：
10.1080/00323187.2021.1948344
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发表时间：
2021-08-21
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Hoshiro, Hiroyuki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hoshiro, Hiroyuki
受援国政治领导人对捐助国的外交访问是否影响捐助国提供的双边官方发展援助的数额？有些人可能会认为，由于援助分配已经由捐助者的成本和收益计算决定，外交访问不会影响捐助者的援助分配行为。尽管回答关于援助分配的决定因素的这些问题很重要，但尚未就这一专题进行研究。本研究以日本为例，探讨受援国外交访问与援助分配之间的关系。日本自20世纪60年代以来一直是世界五大援助国之一，但其援助的动机却被认为是自私自利，完全是为了追求不可告人的经济利益。本文通过对1969年至2015年日本向179个受援国提供的ODA的面板数据进行分析，得出以下结论。第一，受援国政治领导人对日本进行外交访问，使那些已经接受日本援助的国家从日本获得更多的双边官方发展援助。对日本的外交访问越多，援助的增加就越多。这一结果可以用三种机制来解释：（1）外交访问是发展中国家需要援助的代价高昂的信号，（2）当访问者公开要求财政援助时，访问捐助国会在捐助国造成国内政治压力，（3）面对面的会谈可能会为捐助国领导人提供更多了解受援国需求的机会。这一结果是使用不同的模型和几个鲁棒性检查，如工具变量的方法，占反向因果关系和endofilm，误差校正模型（ECM），它可以控制时间依赖性和协整的问题进行了验证。第二，对于过去没有接受过日本援助的发展中国家，外交访问与新援助协议的启动没有关系。这是因为，只有少数国家，如朝鲜，在其领导人首次访问日本时，没有从日本获得ODA。这一结果意味着，援助的启动有其他原因，而不是外交访问。本研究对援助分配和国际关系的研究做出了两个贡献。尽管大量关于援助分配的定量研究
Do diplomatic visits by political leaders of recipient countries to donors influence the amount of bilateral Official Development Assistance (ODA) granted by donors? Some might argue that as aid allocation is already determined by a donor’s cost and benefit calculation, diplomatic visits do not affect the donor’s aid allocation behaviour. Despite the importance of answering such questions regarding the determinants of aid allocation, no research has been conducted on this topic. Focusing on the case of Japan, this study explores the relationship between diplomatic visits from recipients and aid allocation. Since the 1960s, Japan has been one of the top five aid-giving countries of the world; however, its motives have been criticised as self-interested and solely in pursuit of ulterior economic interests.Through an analysis of panel data measuring ODA given by Japan to 179 recipient countries between 1969 and 2015, this paper reached the following conclusions. First, diplomatic visits to Japan by political leaders from aid recipient countries resulted in said countries receiving increased bilateral ODA from Japan in cases where countries were already receiving aid from Japan. The more diplomatic visits made to Japan, the greater the increase in aid. This result can be explained by three mechanisms:(1) diplomatic visits are a costly signal of developing countries’ need for aid,(2) visits to donor countries would create domestic political pressure in donor countries when visitors openly require financial assistance, and (3) face-to-face talks are likely to provide opportunities for leaders of a donor to gain greater knowledge of recipients’ needs. This result was verified using different models and several robustness checks such as an instrumental variables approach that accounts for reverse causality and endogeneity, error-correction model (ECM), which can control for temporal dependence and the problem of co-integration. Second, diplomatic visits were shown to have no relation with the initiation of new aid agreements in cases of developing countries that have not received aid from Japan in the past. This is because, there are only few countries such as North Korea that do not receive ODA from Japan when their leaders visit Japan for the first time. This result implies that aid initiation has other causes rather than diplomatic visits. This study makes two contributions to the study of aid allocation and international relations. Although a considerable amount of quantitative research on aid allocation