Tournaments of financial analysts
Tournaments of financial analysts
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DOI：
10.1007/s11142-013-9255-6
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发表时间：
2014-06
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Huifang Yin;Huai Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Huifang Yin;Huai Zhang
我们认为，财务分析师可以被视为两个比赛（“全明星”锦标赛和公司内部锦标赛）的参与者，并检查分析师是否被激励的锦标赛的薪酬结构。使用1991年至2007年的数据，我们发现，中期输家更有可能增加他们的预测在比赛期间的剩余时间比中期赢家的大胆。这一发现经受住了几次稳健性检查，当中期评估日期接近锦标赛结束时，当分析师缺乏经验时，以及当市场活动很高时，这一发现更加明显。此外，我们发现，临时输家的大胆的变化比临时赢家的信息少。总的来说，我们的研究结果表明，将金融分析师视为锦标赛的参与者为理解分析师的行为提供了一个有用的框架。
We argue that financial analysts can be viewed as participants of two tournaments (the “All-Star” tournament and the intrafirm tournament) and examine whether analysts are incentivized by the tournament compensation structure. Using data from 1991 to 2007, we find that interim losers are more likely to increase the boldness of their forecasts in the remainder of the tournament period than interim winners. This finding survives several robustness checks and is more pronounced when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the tournament period, when analysts are inexperienced, and when the market activity is high. In addition, we show that interim losers’ changes in boldness are less informative than interim winners’. Collectively, our findings suggest that viewing financial analysts as participants of tournaments provides a useful framework for understanding analysts’ behavior.