Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism
Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism
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澄清道德直觉主义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
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通讯作者：
R. Cowan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Cowan
近年来，对伦理直觉主义的兴趣重新抬头，其核心主张是，正常的伦理代理人能够而且确实拥有非推理地合理的一阶伦理信念。尽管这是标准的提法，但在两个意义上它是重要的不完整的。首先，伦理直觉主义声称存在非推理正当的伦理信仰，但关于什么是非推理正当信仰，伦理文献中缺乏共识，这一点令人担忧。其次，人们忽视了非推理辩解的不同类型，而对于任何适当的伦理直觉主义认识论来说，解释某种特定类型的非推理辩解的存在是至关重要的。在这一背景下，本文的目的是提供一种优于现有描述的非推理正当信念的解释，并精炼地陈述伦理直觉主义的核心主张，该核心主张侧重于对可信的直觉主义认识论至关重要的非推理辩护的类型。最后，本文所作的澄清将表明，最近备受关注的两个直觉主义的描述，对直觉主义的核心主张起到了很好的作用，这一点远非显而易见。
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core claim is that normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different types of non-inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non-inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non- inferentially justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non- inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core claim.