Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
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需求中断以及与主导零售商的供应链协调
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2008.06.006
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发表时间：
2009-08-16
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Xiao, Tiaojun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Kebing;Xiao, Tiaojun
本文建立了两个由一个制造商、一个主导零售商和多个边缘零售商组成的供应链协调模型，研究了需求突变后供应链的协调问题。我们考虑了两种协调时间表，线性数量折扣时间表和格罗夫斯批发价格时间表.我们发现，在线性数量折扣计划下，制造商只需要调整需求中断后的最大可变批发价格。对于每一种需求被干扰的情况，在线性数量折扣下，主导零售商的市场份额越高，其平均批发价格和补贴越低，而在格罗夫斯批发价格下，其在供应链利润中所占的份额越高。当需求增长量很大且生产成本足够低时，线性数量折扣计划对制造商更有利。但是，当生产成本足够大时，格罗夫斯的批发价格表总是更好的。我们还发现，中断的需求量在很大程度上影响供应链的利润分配。皇冠版权所有（C）2008年出版的爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and Multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain's profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain's profit. Crown Copyright (C) 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.