Political and Institutional Commitment to a Common Currency
Political and Institutional Commitment to a Common Currency
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对共同货币的政治和制度承诺
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
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通讯作者：
Michael L. Mussa
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作者：
Michael L. Mussa
沿着国际货币基金组织（imf）华盛顿总部一楼的走廊漫步，就会发现一个基本的、无可争辩的事实：在汇率机制运作领域，政治考虑（而非纯粹的经济考虑）才是主要的实际决定因素。尽管最优货币区理论可能会提出其他结果，但除了少数例外，经验规律是一个国家，一种货币。即使是例外情况也有助于证明这一规律。非洲法郎区的共同货币反映了与前殖民大国之间仍然存在着强烈的政治和经济联系。巴拿马（和利比里亚）使用美元作为流通媒介也反映了现在或过去的政治关系。此外，货币区的政治理论不仅仅是对静态事实的陈述；它具有预测能力。罗马帝国在整个帝国范围内实行的通用货币并没有在帝国的衰亡中幸存下来。同样，奥匈帝国和奥斯曼帝国在第一次世界大战后解体后出现的国家也迅速转向各自的货币。1991年底苏联解体时，一些人错误地认为，可以而且应该保留一个卢布区；但现实占了上风，前苏联的15个主权共和国现在都有了独立的国家货币。相反，当开国元勋们在1787年的美国宪法中寻求建立“一个更完美的联盟”时，“铸造货币和调节其价值”的权力从各州转移到新的联邦政府。其目标不仅是改善国家内部和国家之间商业和金融的货币基础，而且还因此加强了它们的政治联盟。在今天的欧洲，建立欧洲货币联盟（EMU）的动力主要是基于共同货币的潜在经济效益。然而，这样的提议实际上是不可想象的，不管它可能带来什么经济利益，因为直到最近几年，欧洲的政治分歧还一直是欧洲的特征。而且，直到今天，欧洲货币联盟最有力的支持者往往是那些认为货币联盟不仅是一种有益的经济机制，而且对加强欧洲联盟的政治层面具有实质性和象征性重要意义的人。相反，那些对欧洲更强大的政治联盟持怀疑态度的人也倾向于对欧洲货币联盟持怀疑态度。鉴于政治考虑在决定货币安排方面的中心地位，似乎有必要询问这些考虑如何影响货币区和货币联盟之间的差异，最重要的是在努力将欧洲货币安排从货币区转变为欧洲货币联盟。货币区是一组国家在不同的国家货币之间固定汇率的安排。在某些情况下，汇率可能是严格钉住的，但更多情况下，它们被允许在狭窄的区间内波动。各成员国保留了自己的中央银行，尽管各国货币政策的独立性受到严重限制。货币联盟涉及到更强有力的政治和制度承诺，即绝对通过一种单一货币来固定汇率，这种货币作为一组国家的货币标准。配套的体制结构还包括一个由联盟所有国家共同管理的货币当局，它在整个联盟范围内决定货币政策。*国际货币基金组织研究部，华盛顿特区20431。本文仅代表作者个人观点，不代表国际货币基金组织的观点。
A stroll along the first floor corridor at the International Monetary Fund's Washington headquarters reveals the fundamental and indisputable fact that political considerations, rather than purely economic concerns, are the predominant practical determinants of the domain of operation of currency regimes. Despite the theory of optimum currency areas which might suggest alternative outcomes, with few exceptions, the empirical regularity is one country, one money. Even the exceptions help to prove the rule. The common currencies of the African franc zone reflect a still strong political, as well as economic, linkage to the former colonial power. The use of the U.S. dollar as the circulating medium in Panama (and Liberia) also reflects present or past political relationships. Moreover, the political theory of currency areas is not merely a statement of static facts; it has predictive power. The common currency that Rome imposed throughout its empire did not survive the decline and fall of that empire. Similarly, the states that emerged from the breakups of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires after World War I rapidly moved to separate currencies. When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, some misguidedly thought that a ruble zone could and should be preserved; but reality prevailed, and the 15 sovereign republics of the former Soviet Union all now have independent national currencies. Conversely, when the Founding Fathers sought to construct "a more perfect union" in the U.S. Constitution of 1787, the power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof " was transferred from the states to the new federal government. The objective was not only to improve the monetary basis for commerce and finance within and between the states, but also thereby to strengthen their political union. In Europe today, the drive to construct a European Monetary Union (EMU) has been justified primarily on the prospective economic benefits of a common currency. However, such a proposal would have been literally unthinkable, whatever its possible economic benefits, with the political divisions that characterized Europe until relatively recent years. And, still today, the strongest advocates of EMU tend to be those who see monetary union not only as a beneficial economic mechanism, but also as substantively and symbolically important for strengthening the political dimension of European union. Conversely, those who are skeptical about stronger political union in Europe also tend to be skeptical about EMU. In view of the centrality of political considerations in determining monetary arrangements, it seems essential to ask how these considerations affect the differences between currency areas and currency unions, most importantly in the effort to transform European monetary arrangements from a currency area into EMU. A currency area is an arrangement for a group of countries to peg exchange rates among distinct national currencies. In some cases, exchange rates may be rigidly pegged, but more usually they are allowed to fluctuate within narrow bands. Members retain their own central banks, although with serious constraints on the independence of national monetary policies. A currency union involves a much stronger political and institutional commitment to fix exchange rates absolutely through a single money that functions as the monetary standard for a group of countries. The supporting institutional structure also includes a common monetary authority for all the countries of the union which determines monetary policy on a union-wide basis. * Research Department, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 20431. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the International Monetary Fund.