Hessian Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks
Hessian Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks
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DOI：
10.1007/3-540-44709-1_33
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发表时间：
2001-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Joye;J. Quisquater
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Joye;J. Quisquater
侧信道攻击是最近出现的一类攻击，在实践中被证明是非常强大的。通过测量一些边信道信息（运行时间、功耗等），攻击者能够从不小心实现的密码算法中恢复一些秘密数据。本文研究了椭圆曲线的Hessian参数化，作为抵抗椭圆曲线密码学中这种攻击的一个步骤。这个想法是使用相同的过程来计算点的加法，乘法或减法。因此，与最好的报告方法相比，这提供了33%的性能改进，并且需要更少的内存。
Side-channel attacks are a recent class of attacks that have been revealed to be very powerful in practice. By measuring some side-channel information (running time, power consumption,...), an attacker is able to recover some secret data from a carelessly implemented crypto-algorithm. This paper investigates the Hessian parameterization of an elliptic curve as a step towards resistance against such attacks in the context of elliptic curve cryptography. The idea is to use the same procedure to compute the addition, the doubling or the subtraction of points. As a result, this gives a 33% performance improvement as compared to the best reported methods and requires much less memory.