From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation under Lula
From Fome Zero to Bolsa Família: Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation under Lula
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从零人口到家庭补助：卢拉领导下的社会政策和扶贫
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
A. Hall
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Hall
在费尔南多·恩里克·卡多佐(1995-2002年)，特别是卢拉总统(2003-)执政期间，有条件现金转移(CCT)方案已成为巴西的主流社会政策。这遵循了自1990年代以来拉丁美洲建立有针对性的安全网以减轻贫穷的明显趋势。卢拉巩固和扩大了有条件现金援助计划，最初是在Fome Zero的领导下，后来是Bolsa Família计划，现在是世界上最大的此类计划。它的四个次级方案(提高入学率的教育津贴、产妇营养、食品补充剂和国内天然气补贴)惠及约3000万巴西最贫穷人口，目标是到2006年达到4400万人。自2003年以来，用于博尔萨·法米里亚的支出大幅增加，消耗了最贫穷部门社会援助预算的三分之一以上，这仍然是2006年10月总统选举前的一项旗舰政策。尽管对Bolsa Família的报道令人印象深刻，但仍然缺乏对其社会和经济影响的系统评估。拉丁美洲其他有条件现金援助方案的证据表明，在满足穷人的一些迫切需要方面可能取得积极成果。然而，在实施过程中出现了许多问题。这些问题包括受益者目标确定不力、部际间缺乏协调、监督不足、任人唯亲、问责不力以及所谓的政治偏见。鉴于现金转移在巴西社会政策议程中的地位越来越高，需要提出一些关键问题。这些问题首先是，费米里亚社区在多大程度上确实为减贫作出了贡献；其次，它是否造成穷人更多地依赖政府施舍和政治赞助，而牺牲了对发展的长期社会投资。
Under the administrations of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) and especially President Lula (2003–), conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become adopted as mainstream social policy in Brazil. This follows a marked trend since the 1990s in Latin America towards the setting up of targeted safety nets to alleviate poverty. Lula consolidated and expanded CCTs, firstly under Fome Zero and later Bolsa Família, now the largest such scheme in the world. Its four sub-programmes (educational stipends to boost school attendance, maternal nutrition, food supplements and a domestic gas subsidy) benefit some 30 million of Brazil's poorest people, with a target of 44 million by 2006. Since 2003, spending on Bolsa Família has risen significantly to consume over one-third of the social assistance budget for the poorest sectors and it remained a flagship policy in the run-up to the presidential elections of October 2006. Although coverage of Bolsa Família is impressive, however, systematic evaluation of its social and economic impacts is still lacking. Evidence from other CCT programmes in Latin America suggests that positive results may be achieved in terms of meeting some immediate needs of the poor. However, there have been many implementation problems. These include poor beneficiary targeting, lack of inter-ministerial coordination, inadequate monitoring, clientelism, weak accountability and alleged political bias. Given the heightened profile of cash transfers in Brazil's social policy agenda, key questions need to be asked. These concern, firstly, the extent to which Bolsa Família does indeed contribute to poverty alleviation; and secondly, whether it creates greater dependence of the poor on government hand-outs and political patronage at the expense of long-term social investment for development.