Bubbles, Banks and Financial Stability
Bubbles, Banks and Financial Stability
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.05.002
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发表时间：
2011-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kosuke Aoki;Kalin Nikolov
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kosuke Aoki;Kalin Nikolov
在有限承诺经济中，理性泡沫的宏观经济影响关键取决于是银行还是普通储户持有泡沫。当银行杠杆较高、长期实际利率较低或监管宽松使其能够享受高额存款保险补贴时，银行就会持有泡沫资产。当银行是泡沫的持有者时，当泡沫存在时，这会通过降低存贷款利差来放大产出繁荣，但当泡沫破裂时，也会加深衰退。相比之下，普通储户持有的泡沫的实际影响则要小得多。
The macroeconomic impact of rational bubbles in a limited commitment economy crucially depends on whether banks or ordinary savers hold the bubble. Banks hold the bubble asset when their leverage is high, when long-term real interest rates are low or when lax supervision allows them to enjoy high deposit insurance subsidies. When banks are the bubble-holders, this amplifies the output boom by reducing loan–deposit rate spreads while the bubble survives but also deepens the recession when the bubble bursts. In contrast, the real impact of bubbles held by ordinary savers is more muted.