Cooperative R&D investments and licensing breakthrough technologies: International environmental agreements with participation game
Cooperative R&D investments and licensing breakthrough technologies: International environmental agreements with participation game
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119233
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发表时间：
2020-03
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Nobuyuki Takashima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nobuyuki Takashima
本研究探讨了国际环境协定（IEA）与合作R&D，这可以带来温室气体排放量的大幅减少。为了实现一个大的IEA的规模超过四个国家组成，我们提出了一种新的方法，合作R&D投资和回收和许可费，采用先进的技术，通过应用机制的加入者的增益函数。本研究的核心发现是：（i）通过考虑R&D投资、R&D回收和许可费，可以达成一个大的协议;（ii）明确了先进技术的扩散过程;（iii）通过设置许可费，可以阻止非投资者采用先进的减排技术，而是通过协议参与和投资R&D; ㈣充分参与国比任何其他数目的参与国更容易维持。我们的方法显示了先进减排技术研发后的扩散过程。因此，本文填补了合作研发方法和先进技术扩散过程的研究空白，为通过合作研发实现充分参与国际能源机构和大幅度减少温室气体排放提供了有希望的前景。
This study examines international environmental agreements (IEAs) with cooperative R&D, which can bring about a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve a large IEA size consisting of more than four countries, we propose a novel method of cooperative R&D investment and recovery and a licensing fee for the adoption of advanced technology, by applying the mechanism of a joiner’s gain function. The core findings of this study reveal that: (i) a large agreement can be achieved by considering R&D investment, R&D recovery, and a licensing fee; (ii) the diffusion process of advanced technology is clarified; (iii) non-investors’ adoption of an advanced abatement technology can be prevented by setting a licensing fee and instead, they participate and invest in R&D via agreement; (iv) a full participation state can be more easily sustained than any other number of participants. Our approach shows the diffusion process of advanced abatement technology after R&D. Consequently, this paper fills a research gap in cooperative R&D methods and the diffusion process of advanced technologies and provides a hopeful prospect for achieving full participation in IEAs and a large reduction in GHG emissions by way of cooperative R&D.