Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?
Do CEOs exercise managerial discretion to save their jobs?
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首席执行官是否行使管理自由裁量权来保住自己的饭碗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sungsoo Kim;Rakesh B. Sambharya;J. Yang
首席执行官（CEO）拥有相当大的权力和权威。在许多行业和背景下，CEO离职是从前因、事件本身和相关后果方面进行研究的。然而，首席执行官们在多大程度上行使他们的权力，并试图防止他们被解雇，还没有得到彻底的审查。在这项研究中，我们研究了CEO行使管理自由裁量权的作用，以防止自己的公司倒闭。我们假设，CEO们削减了研发、广告和租金等可自由支配的开支，以提高收益和财务业绩。从标准普尔ExecComp数据库中提取的1992-1998年美国公司CEO更替样本得出474家更替公司和2,066家控制公司年。我们检验了CEO更替和管理者自由裁量权对公司业绩的影响，这些业绩是通过累积异常股票收益来衡量的。我们还比较了营业额和非营业额的公司在CEO离职前的可自由支配支出的模式。结果是一致的，我们的预测，面临终止的CEO试图通过减少可自由支配的支出后，控制公司业绩，公司多元化，账面市值比，CEO所有权，行业和年度假人后，发布更高的收益。
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) wield considerable power and authority. In many industries and contexts, CEO turnover is studied in terms of antecedents, the event itself, and the related consequences. However, the extent to which CEOs exert their power and attempt to prevent their dismissal has not been thoroughly examined. In this study, we examine the role of CEOs exercising managerial discretion in their effort to prevent their own corporate demise. We hypothesize that CEOs cut discretionary expenses such as research and development, advertising, and rent in order to boost earnings and enhance financial performance. A sample of CEO turnover from Standard and Poor’s ExecComp database for the period 1992–1998 in US firms yielded 474 turnover firms and 2,066 control firm-years. We tested the effects of CEO turnover and managerial discretion on firm performance measured by cumulative abnormal stock returns. We also compared the turnover and non-turnover firms in terms of pattern of discretionary spending prior to CEO turnover. The results are consistent with our prediction that CEOs facing termination attempt to post higher earnings by reducing discretionary spending after controlling for firm performance, firm diversification, book to market ratio, and CEO ownership, industry-, and year dummies.