"Sales-at-Risk": A Test of the Mutual Forebearance Theory of Conglomerate Behavior
"Sales-at-Risk": A Test of the Mutual Forebearance Theory of Conglomerate Behavior
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“风险销售”：对企业集团行为相互忍耐理论的检验
DOI：
10.1086/296293
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Robert M. Feinberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robert M. Feinberg
为了理解20世纪60年代中期以来美国出现的大量多样化和集团化的含义，一些经济学家重新提出了爱德华兹（1955）首先提出的“相互容忍”假说。有几篇论文试图正式或测试这一假设，其中指出，企业之间的多市场接触（MMC）有可能促进共谋在一个或多个市场，这些接触发生。使用1976年数据从联邦贸易委员会的业务线的研究，早期的论文（Feinberg 1982）开发了一个框架，评估MMC和在这篇论文测试的相互容忍理论的企业集团行为在公司和行业的水平，使用1976年数据从联邦贸易委员会的业务线计划。这一理论认为，在一个以上市场遇到竞争对手的公司将能够在一个或所有这些市场中促进串通。在公司层面上的证据支持的理论，显示销售风险，多市场接触的重要性的措施，以增加价格成本利润率在适度范围内的浓度，合谋是可行的，但很难实现没有相互宽容。行业层面的结果较弱，对假设提出了一些质疑。* 宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济学副教授。这篇论文是在我担任联邦贸易委员会商业项目顾问时开始撰写的。业务线计划经理已证明，他已审查并批准业务线计划员工使用的避免披露程序，以确保本文中包含的数据不会识别个别公司的业务线数据。这里表达的观点是我自己的，不一定是联邦贸易委员会的观点。我要感谢William Long、乔治Pascoe、大卫Ravenscraft、Melvin Reder和一位匿名推荐人对本项目的帮助。1.这些研究经常提到相互容忍以外的术语（例如，“势力范围”、“扩大的相互依存”）。其中包括亚当斯（1974）、雷诺兹（1976）、赫格斯塔德和罗兹（1978）、阿瑞达和特纳（1979）、斯特里克兰（1980）、范伯格（1982，1984）、斯科特（1982）以及范伯格和谢尔曼（1985）。
In seeking to understand the implications of the large amount of diversification and conglomeration that has occurred in the United States since the mid-1960s, some economists have revived the "mutual forbearance" hypothesis first presented by Edwards (1955). Several papers have attempted to formalize or test this hypothesis, which states that multimarket contacts (MMCs) among firms have the potential for facilitating collusion in one or more of the markets where these contacts occur.' Using 1976 data from the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business study, an earlier paper (Feinberg 1982) developed a framework for evaluating MMCs and inThis paper tests the mutual forbearance theory of conglomerate behavior at both company and industry levels, using 1976 data from the Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business program. This theory states that companies meeting rivals in more than one market will be able to facilitate collusion in one or all of those markets. At the company level the evidence supports the theory, showing salesat-risk, a measure of the importance of multimarket contacts, to increase price-cost margins in the moderate range of concentration where collusion is feasible but difficult to achieve without mutual forbearance. The industry-level results are weaker, casting some doubt on the hypothesis. * Associate professor of economics, Pennsylvania State University. This paper was begun while I was a consultant to the Line of Business program at the Federal Trade Commission. The Manager of the Line of Business program has certified that he has reviewed and approved the disclosure avoidance procedures used by the staff of the Line of Business program to insure that the data included in this paper do not identify individual company line-of-business data. Views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the Federal Trade Commission. I would like to thank William Long, George Pascoe, David Ravenscraft, Melvin Reder, and an anonymous referee for their help on this project. 1. These studies often refer to terms other than mutual forbearance (e.g., "spheres of influence," "extended interdependence"). They include Adams (1974), Reynolds (1976), Heggestad and Rhoades (1978), Areeda and Turner (1979), Strickland (1980), Feinberg (1982, 1984), Scott (1982), and Feinberg and Sherman (1985).