CAPITAL MARKET INFORMATION AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF WEST GERMAN BANKS*
CAPITAL MARKET INFORMATION AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: THE ROLE OF WEST GERMAN BANKS*
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资本市场信息和工业表现：西德银行的作用*
DOI：
10.2307/2233472
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cable
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cable
在正统理论中，外部资本市场扮演着双重角色，提供各种形式的投资融资，并约束效率低下或未能追求利润目标的公司。大量文献谈到外部资本市场的效率，这意味着“公司可以做出生产投资决策，投资者可以在假设任何时候的证券价格充分反映所有可用信息的情况下，在代表公司活动所有权的证券中进行选择”（Fama，I970）。1然而，这种“效率”概念纯粹是技术性的；它主要取决于可获得的信息，并且我们知道信息市场存在专有性和失败问题，这些问题最终源于信息作为商品的某些特殊性（Arrow，I962）。因此，越来越多的文献关注在主体信息不完全或不对称的市场中实现均衡的问题。除其他外，该文献表明，此类信息失败可能导致贷款和信贷市场的资本配给，以及使用严格的抵押品要求作为筛选手段（Jaffee 和 Russell，I976；Stiglitz 和 Weiss，I98I；Cable 和 Turner，I983）。这些可能会影响个别公司和整个系统的效率。资本短缺意味着一些有利可图的投资机会被放弃，生产选择也可能因满足额外财务约束的需要而被扭曲，这些约束旨在引发承担这些投资的公司的信誉度信号。同样，外部资本市场的约束作用可能会因信息“影响力”（Williamson，I975）以及动员和实现股东偏好的成本而受到损害。因此，在 Jensen 和 Meckling（I976）以及 Fama（I980）提出的委托代理框架中，管理理论家认为，对管理层追求非营利目标的约束程度取决于股东干预的交易成本。结果是偏离成本最小化、利润最大化行为的最佳程度，由交易成本水平决定。因此，影响信息在代理人之间分配方式的制度因素可能对配置和技术效率产生重要影响，而西德的工业金融体系提供了一种有效的机制。
In orthodox theory external capital markets play a dual role, supplying various forms of investment finance and disciplining firms which are inefficient, or fail to pursue profit goals. An extensive literature speaks of the efficiency of external capital markets, meaning that 'firms can make production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that represent ownership of firms' activities under the assumption that security prices at any time fully reflect all available information' (Fama, I970.)1 However, this concept of 'efficiency' is purely technical; it depends critically on what information is available, and we know there are problems of appropriability and failure in information markets, deriving ultimately from certain peculiarities of information as a commodity (Arrow, I962). Thus another, growing literature focusses on problems of achieving equilibrium in markets where agents are imperfectly or asymmetrically informed. Amongst other things, this literature shows that informational failures of the kind in question can lead to capital-rationing in loan and credit markets, and the use of strict collateral requirements as screening devices (Jaffee and Russell, I976; Stiglitz and Weiss, I98I; Cable and Turner, I983). These may then be expected to affect the efficiency of individual firms and the system as a whole. Capital shortage implies that some profitable investment opportunities are foregone, and production choices may also be distorted by the need to satisfy additional financial constraints, contrived to elicit signals of creditworthiness of the firms undertaking them. Similarly, the disciplining role of external capital markets can be impaired by information 'impactedness' (Williamson, I975) and the costs of mobilising and giving effect to shareholders' preferences. Thus in the principal-agent framework developed by Jensen and Meckling (I976) and Fama (I980), the degree of constraint on managerial pursuit of non-profit goals, as posited by managerial theorists, depends on the transactions costs of stock-owner intervention. The result is an optimal degree of departure from cost-minimising, profit-maximising behaviour, determined by the level of transactions costs. Institutional factors which affect the way information is distributed amongst agents can therefore have an important bearing on allocative and technical efficiency, and the West German system of industrial finance provides an in-