Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization
Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization
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集聚、税收竞争和财政均等化
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-013-9295-7
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
M. Wrede
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Wrede
本文分析了存在正集聚外部性时财政均等化对不对称税收竞争的影响。它使用关注资本税战略原因的模型来证明，在足够富裕（边际）较大的区域和足够强的集聚外部性的情况下，人均财政能力均等化可以改善资本的空间配置。如果税收收入用于公共物品融资，人均财政能力均等化一般不能同时消除公共物品无效率和空间无效率。然而，要实现事前相同区域的充分效率，需要在存在（不存在）集聚外部性的情况下实现过度（完全）均衡。
This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal equalization on asymmetric tax competition when positive agglomeration externalities are present. It uses a model focusing on the strategic reason for capital taxes to demonstrate that per capita fiscal capacity equalization improves the spatial allocation of capital provided a sufficiently rich (marginally) larger region and sufficiently strong agglomeration externalities. If tax revenue is used to finance public goods, per capita fiscal capacity equalization generally cannot simultaneously eliminate public good inefficiency and spatial inefficiency. However, the achievement of full efficiency for ex ante identical regions requires excessive (full) equalization in the presence (absence) of agglomeration externalities.
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511805660
发表时间：
2002-05
期刊：
--
影响因子：
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作者：
Masahisa Fujita;Jacques-François Thisse
通讯作者：
Masahisa Fujita;Jacques-François Thisse