On existentialism
On existentialism
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论存在主义
DOI:
10.1007/bf00353411
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发表时间:
1983
影响因子:
1.3
通讯作者:
Alvin Plantinga
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Alvin Plantinga
Suppose we begin by endorsing or at any rate not contestin objects have individual essences. An individual essence E of an object x is a property that meets two conditions:(1) E is essential to x, so that it is not possible that x exist but lack E, and (2) E is essentially unique to x, so that it is not possible that there should have been an object distinct from x that had E. I believe it is obvious that there are individual essences. Consider, for example, the property of being William F. Buckley or being identical with William F. Buckley. Surely that property is essential to Buckley; he couldn't have existed but lacked it.(Of course he could have lacked the name'William F. Buckley'; no doubt his parents could have named him'Pico della Mirandola'if they'd wished.) But the property in question is also essentially unique to him; it is not possible that someone distinct from Buckley should have had the property of being identical with William F. Buckley. One kind of essence, then, is the property of being identical with some object-ie the property, for some object x, of being identical with x. Following Robert Adams and Duns Scotus, suppose we call such a property a thisness; the thisness of an individual is the property of being that individual. It is not necessary that we use proper names to specify or refer to thisnesses; when I use the words" the property of being I" or" the property of being identical with me", the property they denote is a thisness. And consider the meanest man in North Dakota: the property of being identical with him is also a thisness.