Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives

Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives
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DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.1285639
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发表时间:
2008-09
期刊:
IO: Regulation
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
J. Choi;Byung-Cheol Kim
J. Choi;Byung-Cheol Kim
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Choi;Byung-Cheol Kim

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本文分析了网络中立性监管对互联网服务提供商(ISP)和内容提供商(CP)投资激励的影响,以及它们对社会福利的影响。在ISP的投资激励方面,我们发现在歧视性制度下,生产能力的扩张降低了优先权的销售价格。因此,与互联网服务提供商声称网络中立性法规会对他们的投资动机产生寒蝉效应相反,我们不能排除相反的可能性。歧视性制度也会削弱缔约方的投资激励,因为缔约方担心ISP会剥夺一些投资利益。
This article analyzes the effects of net neutrality regulation on investment incentives for Internet service providers (ISPs) and content providers (CPs), and their implications for social welfare. Concerning the ISPs' investment incentives, we find that capacity expansion decreases the sale price of the priority right under the discriminatory regime. Thus, contrary to ISPs' claims that net neutrality regulations would have a chilling effect on their incentive to invest, we cannot dismiss the possibility of the opposite. A discriminatory regime can also weaken CPs' investment incentives because of CPs' concern that the ISP would expropriate some of the investment benefits.