Customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion
Customer and retailer rebates under risk aversion
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DOI：
10.1016/j.ijpe.2011.06.002
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发表时间：
2011-10
影响因子：
12
通讯作者：
Ozgun Caliskan-Demirag;Y. Chen;Jianbin Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ozgun Caliskan-Demirag;Y. Chen;Jianbin Li
在供应链环境中，我们分析了制造商的客户和零售商的回扣，这是销售激励提供给最终买家和零售商，分别。这两个回扣的性能的影响，零售商的目标和响应的促销活动，由于他在渠道中的中介地位。早期研究分销渠道中的回扣传统上假设零售商是风险中性的，目标是最大化预期利润。在本文中，我们考虑一个风险厌恶的零售商。我们采用条件风险价值（CVaR）决策准则，正式模型的风险厌恶。利用随机和（有效）价格依赖的需求，我们分析了制造商的回扣金额的决策和零售商的联合库存和定价决策的博弈理论框架。我们提供了几个结构性质的目标函数，并显示单调性的零售商的决策程度的风险厌恶。对于零售商回扣的情况下，我们的唯一均衡的特征，并为客户回扣的情况下，我们证明了均衡的存在性。使用数值例子，我们提供了进一步的见解风险厌恶的影响。例如，给定一个外生批发价格，我们观察到零售商的风险规避参数低于（以上），制造商是更好的零售商回扣（客户回扣）的阈值;这意味着制造商的首选回扣类型可以是不同的，这取决于零售商是否是风险中性或充分规避风险。
In a supply chain setting, we analyze a manufacturer's customer and retailer rebates, which are sales incentives offered to the end buyers and retailers, respectively. The performance of both rebates is influenced by the retailer's objective and response to the promotion due to his intermediary position in the channel. Earlier studies investigating rebates in distribution channels have traditionally assumed that the retailer is risk neutral with the objective of maximizing expected profits. In our paper, we consider a risk-averse retailer. We formally model risk aversion by adopting the Conditional-Value-at-Risk (CVaR) decision criterion. Using a stochastic and (effective) price dependent demand, we analyze the manufacturer's rebate amount decisions and the retailer's joint inventory and pricing decisions in a game theoretical framework. We provide several structural properties of the objective functions and show monotonicity of the retailer's decisions in the degree of risk aversion. For the case of retailer rebates, we characterize the unique equilibrium, and for the case of customer rebates, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. Using numerical examples, we provide further insights on the impact of risk aversion. For example, given an exogenous wholesale price, we observe a threshold value on the retailer's risk-aversion parameter below (above) which the manufacturer is better off with retailer rebates (customer rebates); implying that the manufacturer's preferred rebate type can be different depending on whether the retailer is risk neutral or sufficiently risk averse.