Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis
Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis
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DOI：
10.11228/pcs1981.1986.8_67
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发表时间：
1986-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Shigeru Watanabe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shigeru Watanabe
在开创性的Allingham-Sandmo模型中，纳税人必须按惩罚性税率rr对未申报的收入纳税。这一假设得出的结论是，在一定的风险规避条件下，随着正常税率的增加，逃税的收入也会增加。但在优秀的伊扎克模型中，"罚款被假设为对逃税者征收，就像美国或以色列的税法一样。这一假设导致了不同的结论，即当纳税人具有随收入而减少的绝对风险厌恶时，随着正常税率的增加，逃避的收入减少。关于假设，伊扎克模式可能比阿林厄姆-桑德莫模式更可取，因为前者是以现行税法为基础的。但是，就结果而言，伊扎克模型似乎比阿林厄姆-桑德莫模型更不适合自省，因为在足够高（低）的正常税率下，逃税的动机似乎变得更强（弱）。
In the pioneering Allingham-Sandmo model the taxpayer has to pay tax on the undeclared income at a penalty rate rr. This assumption has led to the conclusion that as the regular tax rate increases the income evaded increases under some conditions of risk-aversion.But in the excellent Yitzhaki model'the fine is assumed to be imposed on the evaded tax, as it is under the American or Israeli tax laws. This assumption has led to the different conclusion that as the regular tax rate increases the income evaded decreases when the taxpayer has the absolute risk aversion which decreases with income. With regard to the assumptions the Yitzhaki model may be preferable to the Allingham-Sandmo model, because the former is based on the prevailing tax laws. But, concerning the results the Yitzhaki model seems somewhat less relevant to introspection than the Allingham-Sandmo model, since at the sufficiently high (low) regular tax rate the incentive to evade the tax seems to get strong (weak).