Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: Inferential deficit or experimental artifact?
Why do people show minimal knowledge updating with task experience: Inferential deficit or experimental artifact?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1080/17470210701855520
复制
发表时间：
2009-01-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Dunlosky, John
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hertzog, Christopher;Price, Jodi;Dunlosky, John
学生通常对学习策略的有效性没有非常准确的认识，比如表象优于死记硬背。在使用这两种策略的多项研究-测试试验中，参与者对列表2的成绩的预测在两种策略下没有显著差异，尽管列表1的回忆能力对想象的回忆要大得多。两个实验评估了关于策略效果的知识更新方面的不足是由于实验人工制品还是由于对策略对回忆的影响的不准确推断。参与者在两个学习测试试验中研究了配对的同事-他们被指示一半使用想象，一半使用死记硬背。元认知判断利用了在列表1测试中关于效果的推理过程的质量，并利用了关于列表中的策略的知识。一种人为的解释--不遵守策略指令--被排除了，而旨在支持推理过程可用数据的操纵得到了改善，但没有完全修复知识更新。
Students generally do not have highly accurate knowledge about strategy effectiveness for learning, such as that imagery is superior to rote repetition. During multiple study - test trials using both strategies, participant's predictions about performance on List 2 do not markedly differ for the two strategies, even though List 1 recall is substantially greater for imagery. Two experiments evaluated whether such deficits in knowledge updating about the strategy effects were due to an experimental artifact or to inaccurate inferences about the effects the strategies had on recall. Participants studied paired associates on two study-test trials-they were instructed to study half using imagery and half using rote repetition. Metacognitive judgements tapped the quality of inferential processes about the effects during the List 1 test and tapped gains in knowledge about the strategies across lists. One artifactual explanation-noncompliance with strategy instructions-was ruled out, whereas manipulations aimed at supporting the data available to inferential processes improved but did not fully repair knowledge updating.