Security Analysis of Hardware Trojans on Approximate Circuits
Security Analysis of Hardware Trojans on Approximate Circuits
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DOI：
10.1145/3386263.3407591
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发表时间：
2020-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuqin Dou;Shichao Yu;Chongyan Gu;Máire O’Neill;Chenghua Wang;Weiqiang Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuqin Dou;Shichao Yu;Chongyan Gu;Máire O’Neill;Chenghua Wang;Weiqiang Liu
对于容错应用，近似计算提供了计算的折衷以实现改进的速度和功率性能。近似电路，特别是近似算术电路，直接影响计算系统的性能。因此，近似电路设计已被广泛研究。然而，近似电路的安全问题一直被忽视。此外，在制造产业链中的不可信代工厂制造的芯片中也发现了硬件木马。硬件木马可以影响功能的近似电路在非常罕见的情况下与微不足道的足迹。本文利用基于信号转移概率的硬件木马插入方法对近似电路中的安全威胁进行了研究和评估。以一种近似低部加法器为例进行了分析。评估结果表明，随着近似模块数的增加，近似LOA加法器比精确LOA加法器更容易被嵌入硬件木马。
Approximate computing, for error-tolerant applications, provides trade-offs for computations to achieve improved speed and power performance. Approximate circuits, in particular approximate arithmetic circuits, directly affect the performance of a computing system. Hence, approximate circuit designs have been extensively studied. However, security issues of approximate circuits have been ignored. Moreover, hardware Trojans have been found in fabricated chips in manufacturing industry chains by untrusted foundries. Hardware Trojans could affect the functionality of approximate circuits under very rare circumstances with inconsiderable footprints. In this paper, hardware Trojan insertion methods based on signal transition probability are utilized to investigate and evaluate the security threats in approximate circuits. A approximate low-partor-adder (LOA) adder is utilized as an example and analyzed in the paper. The evaluation results show that with the increase of the number of approximation modules, the approximate LOA adder is more possible to be inserted hardware Trojans than the exact LOA adder.